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CHAPTER 1.   INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research question 
In November 2005, a newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr 
Støre made a promise in an address to the Norwegian Storting
1
: 
 The government intends to step up the Norwegian participation in UN 
 operations, with a particular focus on Africa. The government wishes to 
 re-establish Norway‟s credibility as a contributor to UN-led peace 
 operations. We want to enhance the UN‟s ability to lead complex 
 operations because we know that in many cases the organization is well 
 suited to the job.
2
 
The same sentiment was affirmed in the Platform for governmental cooperation 
between The Norwegian Labor Party, Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party 2005-
09 (hereafter: Soria Moria Platform 2005-2009)
3
. Five years later the Norwegian 
Government was being criticized for its deployment of troops in a UN peacekeeping 
operation in Africa, more specifically the contribution to the United Nations Mission 
in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT
4
). In 2008, the United Nations 
Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon had requested Norway to assist with a so-
called enabling force for the UN troops in Abéché in Chad. Norway replied willingly 
and in May 2009 they provided a Level II hospital deployed with military health 
personnel and a water-drilling unit. The Norwegian contribution in Chad was a notable 
break from 17 years without Norwegian military contribution to a UN-operation in 
Africa.
5
 However, in June 2010, the enabling force withdrew after just one year of 
deployment. This decision was reached despite the UN pleading Norway to stay, and 
predictions that the entire operation would break down if the hospital closed down.
6
  
In sum, Norway chose to materialize the political promises of Soria Moria by 
deploying a high quality hospital with a limited time frame of one year. Critics held 
                                                                
1 The Norwegian Parliament.  
2 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Støre, G. J. Statement at the Norwegian Storting, 09.11.2005. Translation by Norway‟s 
Permanent Mission to the United Nations [URL].  
3 Soria Moria Platform 2005-2009, 11.  
4 The operation‟s official name is MINURCAT II, but will hereafter only be referred to as MINURCAT. 
5 Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, „2.3.4 FN sine fredsoperasjonar‟ In: Gov. prop. 1 S (2010–2011), 2 
Tryggingspolitiske rammer og norske hovudprioriteringar. 2010.   
6 Høybråten, D. Spørretimespørsmål. 24.03.2010.  
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that the Norwegian contribution was too expensive and too brief, arguably reflecting a 
general trend of Western states‟ willingness to finance peacekeeping in Africa without 
the political staying power to establish long-term stability. Even though the Norwegian 
contribution to MINURCAT was an attempt to change this unfavorable trend of 
Western states, the critique was seemingly the same.
7
  
The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to existing research on the Norwegian 
commitment to peace by analysing the political considerations regarding Norway‟s 
contribution to MINURCAT. By acknowledging that the considerations may consist of 
differing motivational factors and that the complex set of variables can indeed vary 
from each operation, this thesis sets out to shed light on the factors that influenced the 
political considerations for entering and exiting Chad. The choice of case is inspired 
by the questions raised by political commentators and academic researchers 
concerning the motivational factors for the two decision-making processes. The two-
folded research question this thesis will address is:  
What were the basic motives and rationales for the Norwegian contribution to 
MINURCAT, and how much relative influence did the differing interests and values 
have on the decision-making processes? 
Assessing the motivations for engaging in peacekeeping operations is important for 
several reasons. Motives may be the benchmarks that steer the engagement in a 
particular direction, and which define the initial objectives for the operation.
8
 Motives 
may also affect a state‟s ability to function as a facilitator or a mediator. To this, 
Norway has benefited from a position as a country that has continuously been praised 
for its commitment to peacekeeping without trying to enhance national interests or a 
hidden agenda.
9
 On the other hand, one can just as easily argue that clearly established 
value-based motivational factors can also include more hidden elements of self-
interests. Motives can thus include more rhetorical aspects; by framing the intentions 
in a certain way allows the politician to present his agenda according to how he wants 
                                                                
7 See for example: Carvalho, B., Aune, I., and Solhjell, R. Empty rhetoric on Africa peacekeeping. The Guardian. 
13.05.2010. 
8 Kristoffersen, L. Interesser i norsk engasjementspolitikk. 2009, 6. 
9 Kristoffersen, 7. 
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to be perceived, both by his national audience and the international community.
10
 
Moreover, an analysis of the motivational factors influencing decision-making 
processes must include both the official explanations as well as an assessment of more 
concealed variables often characterized by more interest-based traits.  
In the specific case of peacekeeping operations, the process of whether or not to 
participate is a joint decision of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), a partnership that primarily must deal with two tasks. Firstly, 
the two departments will have different agendas and objectives, respectively focusing 
on security issues and foreign affairs. The effort to make the two agendas compatible 
may cause political struggle and necessitate a compromise that may weaken the final 
result. Secondly, there should be a fair amount of concurrence within the departments, 
as well as between them, on basic motivation for engagement. A guideline for these 
challenges is based on the notion that peacekeeping operations are stated as part of the 
Norwegian engagement policy, and contributions to peacekeeping are arguably 
motivated by a value-based agenda. On the other hand, the motivations and rationales 
for contribution to such operations is an area of foreign policy that is particularly prone 
to the intertwining of both values and interests. This so-called dualism can be found in 
several of today‟s international military operations, and have subsequently been 
studied by a variety of researchers and academics.
11
  
In order to grasp the ever-changing dynamics of international politics, continuous 
attempts are made to theorize and define states‟ behaviour. Traditionally, political 
scientists have applied the concepts of interests and values to explain the motivations 
for states‟ behaviour. Broadly formulated, there are three separate ways of applying 
these concepts in order to analyse contemporary foreign politics: There are those who 
argue that there has been a shift away from nation state and interest-based policy-
making to more globalised and value-based approaches.
12
 Others argue that no real 
change has occurred, and that the realist framework of the Cold War era still holds; 
values are just a new way of justifying interest-based policies.
13
 Finally, there are 
                                                                
10 Kristoffersen, 7. 
11 See for example Berger, H. Verdibaserte og realpolitiske interesser? 2005. 
12 See for example Kaldor, M. Human security: reflections on globalization and intervention. 2007. 
13 See for example Duffield, M. Development, Security and Unending war: governing the World of Peoples. 2007. 
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scholars who claim that it is not particularly useful to separate the two approaches, as 
they very often coincide to support the same ends.
14
 The various interpretations point 
to different trends and characteristics of the international system as explanatory factors 
for why states behave the way they do. Accordingly, this thesis acknowledges that 
there is no undisputed way of revealing what are the underlying motives for states‟ 
behaviour; the subject matter is too complex to grasp within one limited approach.  
1.2 Analytical approach  
The classical understanding of small states holds that the smaller the state, the greater 
importance external factors play to state security.
15
 Moreover, it is argued that small 
states have limited international influence on the circumstances affecting their integrity 
and welfare.
16
 However, the Norwegian historian Olav Riste argues that Norway‟s 
security policy is to a large degree influenced by internal factors.
17
 This exception 
from the trend of small states is explained by the following: as a country that believes 
that upholding a certain reputation and international norms is in its own self-interests 
can also be expected to lay self-images and international law as basis for its actions.
18
 
This suggests that Norway‟s security policy is relatively more influenced by 
promoting an image as a peace nation, whereas more distinct security concerns 
arguably are downplayed. Also, it suggests that upholding international norms and 
promoting humanitarian values indeed can be in Norway‟s self-interest.  
Another understanding of the motivations for both foreign affairs and security policy is 
described as a continuous fluctuation between idealism and realism. In the words of 
Thune and Ulriksen:  
Norway‟s foreign relations […] are like a pendulum swinging from side 
to side, between national interest and national values, between the will to 
secure the state and its territory and the will to represent a global 
cosmopolitan spirituality.
19
 
                                                                
14 See for example Leira, H. Folket og freden. Utviklingstrekk i norsk fredsdiskurs 1890-2005. 2005; Thune, H. and Larsen, 
T. Utenrikspolitikk uten software. En teori om omdømme, populisme og andre politiske trekkrefter i små staters 
utenrikspolitikk. 2000.  
15 Knudsen, F. O., Beslutningsprosesser i norsk utenrikspolitikk, 1997, 71.  
16 Riste, O. Norway‟s foreign relations – a history. 2005. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Berger, H. Verdibaserte og realpolitiske interesser? 2005, 28. 
19 Thune, H. and Ulriksen, S. Norway as an Allied Activist – Prestige and Penance through Peace. 2002, 3. 
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Describing the aspirations of the Norwegian government as a pendulum may be 
particularly suitable to the decision-making process of engaging in Chad, as the 
contribution was initially praised for its efforts, and thereafter criticized for its 
discontinuation. One critic of the withdrawal, Research Fellow at NUPI, Benjamin de 
Carvalho, voiced his concern in an article published by The Guardian.  de Carvalho 
argued that compared to the time and efforts spent on other conflicts such as the ISAF 
operation in Afghanistan, the brief mission in Chad has appeared cursory and 
uncommitted.
20
 Even though this might be an accurate analysis, it is not particularly 
convincing without a clear understanding of the Norwegian government‟s intentions 
for participating in the operation. If the contribution was motivated by a desire to assist 
the UN troops until they had managed to stabilize the region, then yes: withdrawing 
before the mission was completed appears cursory. But if the motivations were based 
on the intentions of showing support for a shorter time-period, and then leaving the 
responsibility to another country, it may rather be considered as an unfortunate event 
that no other country was willing to cover the running of the hospital, causing Norway 
to depart MINURCAT with allegations of abandoning its responsibility. Consequently, 
it is important to get a well-founded understanding of the Norwegian government‟s 
intentions for engaging in the peacekeeping operation in Chad. 
In order to untangle the research question, this thesis will propose two sets of 
hypotheses. The hypotheses are developed from the information collected from official 
documents from the Ministries of Defence, Finance and Foreign Affairs, as well as 
interviews with decision makers and advisors in the various departments. The two 
events of entering and exiting Chad will include three sets of proposals to the 
motivational factors in the decision-making processes. The reason for dividing the 
operation in Chad into two separate case studies is based on indications from reports 
on the subject matter suggesting that the motivation for engaging in Chad differ 
substantially from the decision to withdraw. Although it might have allowed for a 
more thorough analysis to limit the discussion to the entrance or the withdrawal of the 
Norwegian forces to Chad, this thesis holds that a more holistic conclusion may be 
drawn on the Norwegian peace engagement by discussing both actions. The six 
                                                                
20 Carvalho, B., Aune, I., and Solhjell, R. Empty rhetoric on Africa peacekeeping. The Guardian. 13.05.2010.  
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hypotheses that will be tested in this thesis are the following: 
Hypothesis H1(a): Values were the main explanatory factor for why Norway chose to 
participate in the UN-led operation in Chad. 
Hypothesis H1(b): National interests were the main explanatory factor for why 
Norway chose to participate in the UN-led mission in Chad. 
Hypothesis H1(c): Both values and national interests affected the decision to 
contribute to the mission in Chad. 
The considerations concerning the contribution to MINURCAT stretched over a two 
years period. As Thune and Ulriksen‟s aforementioned pendulum illustrated, 
Norwegian foreign relations are apparently influenced by both the will to accomplish 
peace and security in other countries and the will to secure national interests. Over 
time, this swings from side to side, in the same way as political considerations may 
change from the one motive to another. Based on this observation, this thesis‟ method 
of separating the two events allow for the study of whether the motivations and 
rationales for participating in MINURCAT perhaps moved from a rather substantial 
value-based consideration for participating, to a situation where more interest-based 
considerations were given more importance, resulting in the withdrawal of the 
Norwegian troops. The other set of hypotheses are therefore the following:  
Hypothesis H2(a): Values were the main explanatory factor for why Norway chose to 
withdraw from the UN-led operation in Chad. 
Hypothesis H2(b): National interests were the main explanatory factor for why 
Norway chose to withdraw from the UN-led mission in Chad. 
Hypothesis H2(c): Both values and national interests affected the decision to withdraw 
from the mission in Chad.  
Relying on the premises of interests and ideals put forward by Thune and Ulriksen, 
this thesis will assess the data collected by applying two theoretical perspectives. The 
first theoretical perspective will assess the motivation and rationales for participating 
7 
 
in Chad from a value-based perspective. Values as motivational factors will in this 
regard mainly rely on Max Weber‟s concepts of „ethics of conviction‟ and „ethics of 
responsibility‟. The other perspective will consider the interest-based motivations for 
the operation, including „hard‟ interests such as national security and economic 
interests, but also the „softer‟ interests such as success rate and promoting an image as 
a peacekeeping nation. Moreover, the answers provided by the data sources will be 
analysed based on indications. Indicators will in this regard not refer to the typical 
statistical conceptions of the term, but rather what the findings imply: What direction 
are the findings from official documents pointing to? Is the data suggesting that 
interests, values or both factors motivated the political decisions? 
1.3 Norway’s commitment to peace 
The willingness to contribute to peacekeeping operations can be placed within a 
broader commitment to peace. This commitment springs form Norway‟s engagement 
policy, which includes commitment to human rights, promotion of peacebuilding and 
environmental issues, and supporting development through aid and assistance.
21
 
According to the 2008 report National Interests published by the MFA, Norway is 
regarded as „an open, globalised, tolerant, peace-loving and egalitarian country, […] 
and Norway‟s policy of international commitment is often cited as unequivocally 
benevolent and effective.‟22 Even though it may be tempting to concur with these 
favourable characteristics of Norway, it is still important to question the rather 
stereotyped image. Hence, this thesis calls for a more critical assessment of the 
variables constituting the motivational framework of the engagement policy, and 
especially the basis for participating in peacekeeping operations.  
Norwegian authorities spent almost 1 billion NOK on peace and reconciliation efforts 
in 2008,
23
 which placed Norway as one of the main financial contributors to UN peace 
operations. Although financial contributions are appreciated as a token of commitment 
and trust, Norway‟s relationship to the organization was strengthened through the 2005 
Governmental Proposition Soria Moria declaring that the government aimed to 
                                                                
21 Lunde, L. and Thune, H. (eds).  National Interest: Foreign Policy for a globalised world. 2008, 6.  
22 Ibid, 46. 
23 Ibid, 68. 
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increase Norwegian presence in the UN‟s ground forces in general, and specifically 
peacekeeping operations on the African continent.
24
 This objective was also reaffirmed 
in Soria Moria II, but without the emphasis on Africa.
25
 Increasing support to 
peacekeeping – especially in a fairly neglected region like the African continent, 
upholds Norway‟s image as a peace nation and gives „the appearance of being a 
country strongly oriented towards peace and reconciliation.‟26  
The branding of Norway as a responsible „humanitarian superpower‟27 is something 
that is carefully grounded within a value-based framework, where altruism and 
solidarity play fundamental roles.
28
 This does not, however, imply that national 
interests or traditional pragmatism such as state security and economic interests are 
absent from the equation. To place Norway‟s commitment to peace within a more 
idealistically oriented framework is rather a way to underscore that the main rationales 
for committing to international peacekeeping operations should first and foremost be 
to secure peace in that area, and if that objective leads to securing Norway‟s state 
interests, that‟s considered as a positive bi-effect. This train of thought is well known 
in Norwegian foreign politics, and constitutes the claim that Norway is more secure in 
a secure world. There are, however, those who claim that Norway‟s commitment to 
peace has increasingly been justified on the basis of Norwegian self-interests.
29
 Based 
on a realist model, this proclaimed tendency is explained on the notion that the so-
called peace diplomacy is primarily an instrument to enhance national business- and 
security interests. On the other hand, the traditional notions of diplomacy are also 
combined with an outwardly idealistic objective to secure and maintain peace. This 
proclaimed merger of two potentially opposing motivations might be the cause of 
tension within a country‟s foreign policy.  
1.4 Introduction to the humanitarian and security situation in Chad 
Chad, officially known as the Republic of Chad, is a landlocked country in the middle 
of Central Africa. Surrounding countries are Libya to the north, Sudan to the east, the 
                                                                
24 Soria Moria Platform 2005-2009, 11.  
25 The Norwegian Government, Platform for governmental cooperation between The Norwegian Labor Party, Socialist Left 
Party and the Centre Party 2009-2013, 10. (hereafter: Soria Moria Platform 2009-2013) 
26 Lunde and Thune, 68. 
27 The Norwegian Government. „12.1 Norge som humanitær stormakt‟ In: NOU 2003: 19, Makt og demokrati. 2003. 
28 The Norwegian Government, Government Proposition no. 15 Interesser, muligheter og ansvar. 2009. 
29 Harpviken, B. K. and Skjelsbæk, I. Skjerp Fredspolitikken! Aftenposten 29.11.10. 
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Central African Republic to the south, Cameroon and Nigeria to the southwest, and 
Niger to the west.
30
 The country is one of the least economically developed and most 
corrupt countries in the world, and over 60 per cent of Chadians live in extreme 
poverty,
31
 generally accepted to be caused by failed crops following draught and 
periods of civil war. The country was liberalized from French rule in 1960, but has, as 
an independent country continued to suffer from political instability, periods of civil 
wars as well as sporadic armed conflicts with neighbouring country Libya in the 
period between 1978 and 1987.  
In recent time, Chad has continuously been affected by the instabilities in the region. 
Since the breakout of the 2004 Darfur crisis in neighbouring country Sudan, the 
eastern part of Chad has been an unstable and insecure area.
32
 Oxfam reports that over 
half a million people have fled their homes in Sudan to come to camps in the region, 
involving 250,000 Sudanese refugees, 180,000 displaced Chadian and 70,000 refugees 
from Central African Republic who are entirely dependent on humanitarian 
assistance.‟33 The UN states that the armed activities and banditry in eastern Chad 
threatens the security of the civil population. Furthermore, the atrocities committed by 
rebels in the region have resulted in serious human rights violations and breaches of 
international humanitarian law.
34
  
In September 2007, the UN Security Council approved a resolution to send a European 
military force (EUFOR) of 3,700 troops and a Chadian police force (DIS) under the 
UN umbrella (MINURCAT) to protect all civilians. EUFOR was established by a 
request from the Chadian government,
35
 and by UN Security Council Resolution 1778 
EUFOR forces was intended to:  
                                                                
30 Store Norske Leksikon, Tsjad. [URL]  
31 Globalis. Tsjad. [URL]  
32 Oxfam. Oxfam and the Chad crisis – March 2009. 2009.  
33 Ibid.  
34 UN Security Council Resolution 1778, 2007. 
35 UN Security Council Resolution 1778, 2007, 2. 
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[…] help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure 
and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by 
contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians 
in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in 
eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic (CAR) and 
by creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic 
and social development of those areas.
36
  
By that resolution and acting under Charter VII of the UN Chapter, the EU military 
force was deployed to support the MINURCAT mandate. Before the completion of 
EUFOR‟s mandate in March 2009, the Security Council authorized the deployment of 
a military component of MINURCAT to follow up EUFOR.  
MINURCAT was envisaged to entail a 5000-strong UN peacekeeping force managed 
by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). When entering Chad and the 
Central African Republic (CAR), MINURCAT was set to carry out a wide range of 
functions in a more multi-facetted operation than the EUFOR. Although the new 
MINURCAT mandate was introduced in order to strengthen the forces‟ ability to 
secure the situations of the refugees, commentators have argued that it was simply 
„more of the same.‟37 The transition from EUFOR to MINURCAT did, however, not 
involve noticeable security gaps, as many of the EU troops previously stationed in 
Chad remained on the ground as part of the new MINURCAT mission. However, a 
few EU countries decided to depart the mission during the troop turnover, including 
Italy, which had been in charge of the running of a field hospital in Abéché.  
Following Italy‟s departure, the DPKO sent a request to Norway to continue the 
running of the field hospital in joint efforts with Serbia. Norway provided a National 
Deployable Hospital (NDH) deployed with a total amount of 150 personnel, including 
health personnel and a support division. In addition, Norway assisted with a well-
drilling unit in Abéché to improve the hospital‟s supply of water until its departure in 
                                                                
36 MINURCAT, Minurcat Mandate. [URL] 
37 Fick, M. The EUFOR to MINURCAT transition in eastern Chad: it may not be pretty. 17.03.2009.  
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May 2010.
38
 A more elaborative description of the Norwegian contribution to 
MINURCAT will be provided in Chapter 6.1. 
The internal political situation in Chad was highly challenged by the conflict with 
neighbouring Sudan, where the UN had a limited political mandate to interfere.
39
 By 
restricting the mandate of MINURCAT to the protection of civilians and fighting the 
widespread occurrence of sexual violence, it was difficult to establish the necessary 
conditions for a safe return of refugees and IDP‟s. Although MINURCAT achieved 
relatively good results in the areas of security and to the strengthening of the justice 
and corrective system, the forces were asked to leave by President Déby, after only 
two years of deployment.
40
 The government did, however, underscore that they wanted 
the civilian activities, including the hospital, water-drilling unit and general logistics to 
remain.
41
 At the end of 2010, MINURCAT handed over its main tasks to the 
Government of Chad and the UN agencies present, responsibilities including „security 
of refugees, IDPs and humanitarian workers in eastern Chad.‟42 The authors of the 
NUPI report An Honourable Exit for MINURCAT? claim that there is „a high risk that 
eastern Chad, which was on its way to early recovery, may again become a 
humanitarian crisis.‟43 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY  
Peace and Conflict Studies is a uniquely challenging discipline, characterized by its 
multifaceted make up. Due to the complex nature of its multi-disciplinary design, it 
lacks the well-defined and established research methods of the more traditional 
disciplines that it is comprised of. However, combining work from a wide range of 
academic disciplines, thus relying on a more inductive explorative methodology that is 
not controlled by firmly established theories,
44
 may offer new insights to the academic 
debate. Appreciating the strengths of a combined framework of sociology, 
international relations, political science and general theories from peace and conflict 
studies, can provide a more holistic approach to the questions about foreign policy in 
general, and specifically in peacekeeping operations. While recognizing that 
researchers disagree on the applicability of a multi-disciplinary approach and the 
criteria for a good methodology, this thesis holds that the explorative design is a useful 
way of structuring the political considerations for the Norwegian MINURCAT 
contribution.  
2.1 Sources 
The interplay between domestic security issues and foreign political affairs have been 
subject to various analysis,
45
 and the particular case of Norway‟s engagement policy 
has indeed been explored from various perspectives.  A review of the existing research 
articles on this subject shows that there are many scholars focusing on the intentions 
and motivations behind the Norwegian engagement in general, but few have conducted 
a case study of the motivational framework of a specific peacekeeping operation. It is 
only the IFS report by Lene Kristoffersen, Interests in Norwegian engagement policy 
that analyzes Norwegian authorities‟ motivations for engaging in specific 
peacekeeping operations. Kristoffersen‟s report gives a thorough study of the 
triggering motives of Norwegian peacekeeping efforts, discussing the cases of 
Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sri Lanka and Sudan.
46
 Kristoffersen‟s findings 
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functioned as a valuable platform for this thesis‟ study of the Norwegian efforts in 
Chad, and the variables assessed were especially inspiring to the theoretical make-up. 
The report found that „the main driving force behind Norwegian peacebuilding efforts 
has been humanitarian value-based motives rather than specific interests.‟47 However, 
it is underscored that interests have not been insignificant, especially in the case of the 
engagement in Bosnia. Moreover, Kristoffersen found that in the case of Guatemala, 
Sri Lanka and Sudan, „traditional national interests such as security and economic 
incentives played a minor role.‟48 The study‟s choice of motivational factors, such as 
prestige, visibility, access to central players etc., has been borrowed to constitute the 
theoretical framework of this thesis. However, partly due to a more narrowed focus, 
this thesis did not include all of Kristoffersen‟s explanatory variables, such as the 
element of individual aspirations and ambitions.  
In order to get a well-founded understanding the particular case of the Norwegian 
contribution to MINURCAT, it is helpful to place the motivations and rationales 
within a larger framework of the Norwegian commitment to peace. This rather broad 
investigation of the motivations for the Norwegian engagement policy and the various 
experiences with peacekeeping efforts allows for a general overview of the historical 
trends. Relevant reports in this regard are the works of Leiv Lunde and Henrik Thune 
in the MFA report National Interest: Foreign Policy for a globalised world, as well as 
the NUPI report edited by Halvard Leira, called Norwegian self-images and 
Norwegian foreign policy. While recognizing that the various explanations do 
constitute some of the very fundamentals of the Norwegian engagement policy, this 
thesis aims at complementing the results with empirical findings from the particular 
motivational factors of the MINURCAT contribution.  
When applying a framework of interests and values, Professor of International Politics, 
Janne Haaland Matlary, contributes to the discussion with a useful understanding of 
how the terms are perceived by decision-makers in Norwegian foreign politics. As part 
of a five years study conducted by the Faculty of Social Science at the University of 
Oslo, called Makt –og demokratiutredningen, Professor Matlary analysed the 
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relationship between value-diplomacy and realpolitik in Norwegian foreign policy. 
The empirical study was based on interviews with government officials, and found that 
the strategies of the Norwegian engagement policy, or what Matlary calls „value-
diplomacy‟ is not characterized by direct strategic thinking, but neither can it be 
classified as purely altruistically motivated. The study concludes that Norwegian 
foreign policy has a much sought after „capital‟ in its value-diplomacy, which has not 
yet been subject to sufficient reflection.  
This thesis has especially benefited from the empirical data provided by the interviews 
with Norwegian government officials and Professor Matlary‟s interpretations of the 
various ways of how government officials relate to the dynamics of interests and 
values in foreign politics.
49
 Further, Helene Forsland Berger‟s Master Thesis on the 
considerations prior to the 2003 war in Iraq has provided additional knowledge on the 
decision-making processes of whether or not to participate in international military 
operations. Berger‟s thesis explores the factors contributing to Norway‟s decision of 
refraining from participating, and finds that value-based interests such as international 
law and Norway‟s image as a peace nation were guiding in the considerations prior to 
the war, whereas more interest-based factors such as the importance of allies and 
reciprocity characterized the debate succeeding the US-invasion.
50
 
The empirical data is collected from official documents research papers, as well as 
seven interviews: one former State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, one Senior 
Advisor at the Ministry of Defence, one Senior Peace Operations Advisor at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one Deputy Military Adviser at the Permanent Mission of 
Norway to the UN, one Research Fellow at NUPI and former Special Assistant to the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to MINURCAT, one 
Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and one Professor at 
Oslo University Collage. Each of the interviewees is knowledgeable of the issues 
concerning Norwegian foreign policies, and especially the questions regarding 
peacekeeping operations and Chad. 
                                                                
49 Matlary, J. H, En strategisk analyse av norsk utenrikspolitikk, 2002. 
50 Berger, 2005. 
15 
 
2.2 Conducting a case study: the method of process-tracing 
The choice of case study methods allows for a close examination of the causal 
mechanisms affecting the two processes, thus testing the hypotheses set out to explain 
both actions. In the words of Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, the 
motivation for this methodological choice is based on the following consideration: a 
case study approach involves the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical 
episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other 
events.
51
 It is not the intention of this thesis to develop a theory that will be applicable 
to the motivational framework of peacekeeping operations in general, although some 
basic assumptions regarding political trends in Norwegian foreign affairs will be made. 
The intention is rather to discuss which theoretical framework has the most 
explanatory power in interpreting the motivations for the MINURCAT contribution. 
To this point, this thesis recognizes that the theoretical explanations only offer a 
limited description of reality, and will therefore not be used as a way of confirming or 
discarding theories. Nevertheless, the theories will contribute with helpful terms and 
concepts, which will constitute the fundament of the analysis.  In order to explore the 
motivations affecting the political considerations, this thesis especially relies on the 
method of process-tracing, attempting to trace the links between possible causes and 
observed outcomes.  
In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival 
documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the 
causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact 
evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that 
case.
52
 
In other words, the process-tracing involves a rather intensive study of one event, in 
this case the MINURCAT contribution – and the independent variables affecting the 
decisions of contributing and withdrawing. The type of process-tracing applied is the 
so-called analytical explanation, where the historical narrative is converted into an 
analytical causal explanation „couched in explicit theoretical forms.‟53  
It is important to note that the extent to which a historical narrative is transformed into 
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a theoretical explanation indeed can vary, and when analysing political considerations 
or chain of events, there is seldom a linear, straightforward causality, but rather a 
complex form where the decisions are affected by several variables. Such complex 
interaction effects are difficult to identify and pose as a challenge to the method of 
process-tracing. For that reason, this thesis has paid special attention to the historical 
events contributing to the basis of contemporary Norwegian foreign relations and 
aimed to make a thorough analysis of the basic events leading up to the MINURCAT 
contribution. The different variables are presented in an attempt to map out some of 
the more linear factors affecting decision-making processes of today. Others, less 
concrete variables are of course more difficult to trace back to historical events, and 
will consequently offer more ambiguous explanations.   
2.3 Challenges to the case study: ‘selection bias’ and the magnitude of results 
Contrary to the objective of statistical studies; case study methods do not necessarily 
aim to use the findings of the study to generate better understanding of a broader part 
of society, but rather to map out a detailed understanding of contextual factors. While 
statistical studies allow for a more wide ranging study of tendencies and trends, case 
studies open for more in-depth questions and thorough elaborations of concepts and 
connections. Further, „case studies have powerful advantages in the heuristic 
identification of new variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier 
cases and in the course of field work – such as archival research and interviews with 
participants, area experts and historians.‟54 As George and Bennett argue, the 
researcher can be flexible to the explanatory variables, as new information gathered 
from interviews and studies of documents would have to be included and perhaps also 
change the initial hypotheses, which again must be tested through previously 
unexamined evidence.  
Although case studies are generally valuable in testing hypotheses and particularly 
useful for theory development, there are certain limitations and potential drawbacks of 
applying this method. One of the most common critiques is that this method is 
particularly prone to „selection bias,‟55 which commonly occur when the subjects are 
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self-selected and chosen because they share a particular outcome. Although selection 
biases are a potentially severe problem, analysts and practitioners have argued that 
they should not be rejected out of hand, as it does not involve the same challenges as it 
does to statistical research. In statistical studies, a selection bias will understate the 
strength of the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable, and 
statistical researchers should therefore not select cases on the dependent variable.
56
 In 
case studies, however, selecting cases on the dependent variable „can help identify 
which variables are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome.‟57  
Before deciding which motivational factors to include in this thesis‟ analysis, several 
explanatory variables were assessed, and based on preliminary informative interviews 
conducted they were later eliminated on the basis of not being particularly relevant to 
the subject matter. As several of the interviewees requested that the interview was not 
recorded, the information collected was only noted, and later sent to the interviewees 
for final approval. Even though the interviewees were not balanced according to 
institutions and gender, all provided useful information in supplement to the 
theoretical perspectives and the official documents. In order to avoid the dangers of 
„selection bias‟, this thesis would perhaps have benefited from an even more extensive 
sample of interviews and official documents. However, by including arguments posed 
by both political advisors, decision-makers, critics, commentators, researchers and 
academics, the rather inclusive sample size was an attempt to avoid the dangers of 
excluding variables that appear contradictory to the theory.  
Another challenge related to case study methods is what George and Bennett explains 
as case studies‟ ability to only make tentative conclusions on how much a variable 
mattered to the outcome, limiting the analysis to assessing whether and how it 
mattered. As the decision to participate in a peacekeeping operation indeed is guided 
by several variables, this thesis is particularly vulnerable to this challenge: it is only 
possible to map out what the interviewees and the official documents regarded as 
decisive factors in the process, and less possible to say to what extent the variables 
affected the decisions. The study is thus in danger of being too descriptive, reporting 
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on the stated motivational factors, with little ability to evaluate how the various 
motivations have affected the decisions differently. Therefore, the analysis of this 
thesis will give a more thorough assessment of the opinions that received the most 
attention, both in the political and public debate.  
Based on the theoretical framework, the different motivations for engaging in 
peacekeeping operations can be operationalized in a model of three components: 
national interests, value-based motivational factors, and national costs. However, this 
simple approach is not very useful, as motivations can often be both rational and non-
rational at the same time, depending on the interpretation done by both the informant 
and the researcher. It is inevitable that, when repeated, another researcher will achieve 
different results when interpreting the results from the data. This is due to the fact that 
even though the interviewees are indeed informed and trustworthy, conceptions will 
naturally change over time, as new information is acquired, new theories are 
developed, more context known, and general political thinking changes. Also the very 
fact that it is qualitative makes it in some way subjective; as the observers will 
interpret the results differently. Therefore, the analysis‟ conclusion cannot evaluate to 
what extent the different variables affected the decision-making process, only map out 
how it was perceived by the different informants, and how those perceptions were 
communicated to the researcher.  
2.4 Trusting the findings: validity and reliability 
As the latter sections have articulated, the methodological framework of this thesis 
applies a qualitative research design on one specific case or event, a strategy, which 
constitutes an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research. The 
question of how well the case study fares in order to illustrate the motivations of the 
Norwegian government in the decision-making process, is thus dependent on the way 
it is conducted, according to the principles of validity and reliability; methodological 
measures applied to determine whether the operationalization of the study is 
satisfactory.
58
 When conducting a case study, the researcher is able to achieve high 
levels of conceptual validity, or to identify and measure the indicators that best 
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represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure.
59
 A high level of 
validity refers to whether the results from the study are actually answering the 
questions posed by the research question, in other words: concurrence between the 
question and the collected data. To strengthen the validity of the thesis one must be 
aware of the relationship between the theoretical and operationalized definitions, in a 
fashion where the results gathered from the study is actually in line with the theoretical 
questions that were posed. As the theoretical concepts of interest and values are 
subject to various usages and understandings, this thesis presents a thorough review of 
how these terms are defined in this context. Both terms may include a number of 
variables, but due to the limited scope of this thesis, only six have been selected to 
reflect the motivational framework. This may of course have weakened the final 
results, as there are variables such as „personal aspirations‟ that would have 
contributed to a broader understanding.  
In order to establish a satisfactory level of validity, the data must have a high level of 
reliability. Reliability involves the question of whether the data from the study are 
trustworthy. To this, the thesis relies on concepts in the social science, which are 
extensively elaborated on in the theoretical framework of this thesis. The empirical 
data is collected from official documents and interviews with government officials or 
researchers on the subject matter. As mentioned, the interviewees were all well 
informed on the subject of peacekeeping operations, and all quotes were sent for final 
approval. The semi-structured interview guide that was used for the interviews can be 
found as an appendix to this thesis, where also all the interviewees are listed.  
2.5 Methodological concerns: defining motivational factors 
Motivations indicate the driving forces behind an action,
60
 and relating to foreign 
policies it can be described as the intentions prior to Norwegian peacebuilding efforts. 
According to political scientist Gunnar Fermann; political motivations differ from 
political behaviour, where the latter refers to the various instruments and techniques 
that are applied to implement policies.
61
 Even though the actual results of the 
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MINURCAT contribution are not subject for analysis, the implementation of the 
policies might reflect the motivational factors, and thereby telling us something about 
the state‟s intentions. To this, the authors of the MFA report Norwegian interests, 
acknowledges an important truth: „If perceptions of Norway that influence foreign 
policy turn out to have little basis in reality, our foreign policy may well fail to reflect 
our real interests.‟62 If the implementation of the policies is not consistent with the 
intentions officially stated, it might also indicate the presence of other governing 
motives.  
In this thesis‟ analysis, the concepts of interests and values are applied as analytical 
tools to grasp the political intentions of the MINURCAT contribution. As stated, the 
various usages and understandings of these terms do pose as a challenge to the validity 
of this thesis. Also, there are factors that deliberately have not been included in the 
analysis. Several more „hidden‟ variables that were not part of the initial framework 
have been discovered, explored and included in the research process. Moreover, one 
might find that there is no clear set of motivations separating interests from values, but 
rather the intertwining of both sets of motivational factors affecting the decision-
making processes. As this thesis aims to analyse both the driving factors for engaging 
in and withdrawing from MINURCAT, it might find that the decisions were motivated 
by completely different sets of rationales. Basically, the study has benefited from its 
explorative design, as the analytical discussion was flexible to new variables, and was 
able to assess their explanatory power. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that a 
complete understanding of all the relevant variables has not been accomplished. 
However, the findings from the data sources led to relatively satisfactory conclusions, 
although a more comprehensive study would have been desirable. 
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CHAPTER 3. DEFINING CONCEPTS 
3.1 The concept of peace 
As the point of departure for this thesis‟ analysis is the Norwegian contributions to 
peacekeeping operations, it is of vital importance to define the concept of peace, and 
peacekeeping operations. Based on the division made by Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, 
this thesis will rely on a two-folded definition of peace. The limited definition focuses 
on absence of war, where the goal is to end violence and establish a truce. Peace in the 
more extended version refers to basic welfare, rights and safety in everyday life, 
commonly linked to the concept of human security. This extended definition of peace 
has broadened the mandate of peacekeeping operations, and has lead to increasing 
demands to states participating in such. As the peacekeeping mission in Chad was not 
related to a direct internal conflict, but rather to secure the humanitarian condition of 
the refugees from the troubled Darfur region and internally displaced people, the 
MINURCAT operation falls under the second part of the definition of peace, as the 
UN forces sought to obtaining human security for the people in the region.  
The mission was worded in the broadest sense, including contributing to „the 
protection of civilians; promote human rights and the rule of law, and promote 
regional peace.‟63 This inclusive mandate is a symptom of how the UN recognizes that 
in order to secure sustainable peace, one must handle the root causes of conflict, and 
manage to protect civilians. This approach to enhancing peace is based on a current 
desire within international peacekeeping operations to prevent atrocities that follow a 
civil war. As the turmoil in Chad has yet to reach the stage of internal war, the 
MINURCAT operation is contributing to preventive efforts. The following section will 
illustrate that peacekeeping efforts are indeed a complex and ambitious project, and 
has subsequently been subject to various revisions and attempts of improvement.  
3.2 Peacekeeping perspectives 
In Understanding peacebuilding, Professor of International Security, Alexander 
Bellamy, outlines seven forms of peacekeeping operations and the various challenges 
related to the objective of managing peace. In order to appreciate the complex nature 
                                                                
63 United Nations, MINURACT Background. 
22 
 
of the considerations prior to the deployment of peacekeeping operations, the 
following sections will provide a brief introduction to Bellamy‟s various ways of 
peacekeeping and the efforts made to relate to the changing character of conflict. 
Preventive deployments are regarded as the most effective form of peacekeeping, as 
outside forces are deployed before warring fractions break into battle. Such 
deployments exists more in theory than in practice, as it is difficult to get the mandate 
and financial resources to apply this form of peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping 
usually takes place between ceasefire and a political settlement, where the warring 
fractions need to be separated. Prior to the operations are three basic assumptions, 
called the holy trinity: consent from the government, impartiality from the intervening 
forces and a minimum use of force.
64
 Wider peacekeeping occurs within a context of 
ongoing violence, and tends to take place during „new wars.‟65 It‟s applied where 
„Westphalian and post-Westphalian ideas collide,‟66 meaning that the operations are 
based on the holy trinity, but has to relate to new conditions following new types of 
conflict. Bellamy‟s argument is that the UN mandate is inadequate, as the UN troops 
are not certain of whether they should protect the civil population, or only work as a 
military force.  
Peace enforcement refers to Charter VII of the United Nations, which gives the 
Security Council authority to determine whether a threat to peace has occurred; order 
provisional measures under Article 40, and order enforcement measures against a 
state, or entities within a state.
67
 Bellamy argues that the mandate of peace 
enforcement operations is often quite vague, and there is still debated whether the UN 
should engage in war fighting at all. Assisting transitions aims to build peace from 
within, with a goal to engage local actors to take part in the operations to foster a 
stable peace, founded on ownership and freedom from external control. A similar 
strategy is Transitional administrations, although the external actors are given a 
mandate to control a territory. David Chandler criticizes this type of peacekeeping, 
claiming that transitional administrations are just a new form of colonialism; where 
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outside actors rule without the consent of the governed.
68
 A top-down approach to 
state building can also be in danger of implying that the local authority is not capable 
of creating sustainable peace on their own, and consequently not allowed to determine 
their own political affairs.
69
 Peace support operations (hereafter PSOs) is developed as 
a solution to the lessons learned by previously often unsuccessful peacekeeping 
operations, and includes a „multifaceted mission that combine a robust military force 
with a significant civilian component.‟70 The main difference from traditional forms of 
peacekeeping is that PSOs don‟t require consent from the local government, as consent 
is understood as „variable, multi-layered and malleable.‟71 One challenge is that the 
concept of PSOs is not universally acknowledged, and the operations carry the 
negative hallmarks of intruding foreign powers to local conflicts. 
As illustrated by Bellamy‟s seven forms of peacekeeping, there is not yet an ideal 
form, or a consensus on an acceptable way for an outside actor to contribute to 
peacebuilding. Intra-state conflicts of the contemporary world are often too complex to 
be handled by one single strategy, and peace support operations have thus become the 
popular way of dealing with conflict and intra-state war. Although MINURCAT was 
established in order to contribute to the protection of civilians; promote human rights 
and the rule of law; and promote regional peace,
72
 the primary responsibility for 
ensuring the security of its civilians was still in the hands of the Chadian government. 
In this sense, the operation is more similar to the traditional forms of peacekeeping. 
According to the UNSG: „MINURCAT has been an unusual and unique United 
Nations peacekeeping operation in that it was devoted solely to contributing to the 
protection of civilians, without an explicit political mandate.‟73 As the multi-
dimensioned mission was not mandated to provide a political solution to the conflict, 
the peacekeeping efforts became highly concerned with the building of infrastructure 
such as roads and water-drills.
74
  The UN Secretary-General‟s statement illustrates 
challenges similar to those outlined by Bellamy: by limiting the mandate to the 
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protection of civilians, the troops did only have limited ways of tackling the root 
causes of the on-going violence in the region.  
3.3 Effects of the Cold War: introducing the concepts of new wars and 
human security 
During the Cold War, the tension between the US and the USSR was the focus of 
attention for many politicians and academics. The 44 years of political tension, proxy 
wars and military competition has been thoroughly analyzed by applying various 
theories concerning international relations, ranging from realist to liberalistic 
perspectives.  
During the Cold War period the international system was characterized by inter-state 
conflicts, often led by formal acts, such as declarations of war. This norm has changed 
during the last two decades, as 95 per cent of armed conflicts have taken place within 
states rather than between them.
75
 The traditional perception of security as concerning 
external military or territorial threats was now challenged by the increase in intra-state 
conflicts, and new and controversial issues came into play, such as the „rights of the 
individuals‟ and human security. This is typically described as a shift away from the 
classical bipolar situation
76
 to the more globalised world of the early twenty-first 
century. Professor of International Relation, Kimberly Hutchings, understands 
globalization as an international system with greater transnational integration and with 
a complex mutual dependence.
77
 By acknowledging the changes in international 
politics, the UN became a more trusted actor where one of its pivotal tasks was how to 
relate to the „new wars‟ and the challenges that followed intra-state conflicts. Professor 
of Global Governance, Mary Kaldor, explains the „new wars‟ as the disintegration and 
collapse of states, following the effects of globalization on the international system.
78
 
To Kaldor, globalization and the interrelationship between states are partly understood 
as the causes of intra-state conflicts, but can also explain how internal conflicts 
become global, thus affecting countries outside their own region. In other words – as 
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changes in the international system may have led to the changing character of war, this 
may in turn have led to changes in the foreign politics of states.  
Although the statistics illustrate a change in the types of conflict, there are of course 
many opposing arguments on the magnitude of this proclaimed shift and the 
consequences of the „new wars‟ on international relations and state sovereignty. 
Scholars who argue that new wars have had little actual change on international 
politics questions states‟ willingness to intervene in internal affairs, the ability of the 
UN to respond, and whether the traditional principles of non-intervention should apply 
to intra-state conflicts. There are, however, two conflicts that marked the 1990‟s, 
which are said to have changed discourse and ideas in international forums since the 
end of the Cold War: the 1992 civil war in Somalia and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 
As the crisis in Somalia mainly had been handled by the US, the stolid tackling of the 
situation in Rwanda was to a larger degree the responsibility of the Security Council. 
Subsequently, the wide spread criticism of the UN regarding it‟s lack of intervention in 
Rwanda laid the ground-stone for the pivotal debate within the UN on how to relate to 
mass atrocities.  
In challenging the principle of „freedom from intervention‟, by referring to crises like 
Rwanda, the debate regarding human security and the norm of non-intervention 
experienced a change of discourse. Some scholars have described the debate that 
followed as the „clash of competing imperatives,‟79 where the high ideals of traditional 
treaties and declarations were challenged by the UN‟s role in maintaining standards for 
individuals within states.
80
 Thus, the concept of „human security‟ was now one of the 
major tasks of the UN, and would be a vital part of the framework for future 
humanitarian interventions. As the mass atrocities in Rwanda did unite the 
international community on the importance of intervention and prevention, the 
member states agreed that in some cases, consent from the national government should 
not necessarily be a condition for intervention. This groundbreaking consensus has yet 
to be applied, as the rhetoric and discussions in the General Assembly has not 
transformed into real-world solutions. This illustrates that human security is a concept 
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that indeed challenges the sovereignty of states and the norm of non-interference, but 
not to the degree that it precedes state sovereignty. Nevertheless, this thesis will, 
without further investigation, support the claim that the new commitment to human 
security and the rights of individuals has challenged state sovereignty, which 
traditionally has pervaded the international community.  
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CHAPTER 4. THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
Previous chapters have been devoted to the political history of peacekeeping 
operations, and presented some of the systemic trends in foreign policy during the 
Cold War and post-Cold War era. This chapter will focus on the theories and ideas 
explaining the underlying motivational factors of foreign policy, with special emphasis 
peacekeeping operations. A classical design of analyzing motivational factors 
separates values and interests into two distinct categories, where value-oriented 
idealism is often defined as contrasting the self-interests of states. Even though this 
thesis indeed recognizes how motivational factors are often intertwined, a separated 
discussion of the two is nevertheless useful as a point of departure for the further 
analysis. The first part will consider a value-based approach to explaining motivational 
factors, where Max Weber‟s ideas of „ethics of conviction‟ and „ethics of 
responsibility‟ offer a useful division. The Norwegian engagement policy is commonly 
defined within a value-oriented framework,
81
 and is separated from other parts of the 
foreign political agenda, such as trade and security. As peacekeeping operations are 
part of the wider engagement policy, it naturally falls within the same motivational 
framework. Even so, there may be other factors present in the decision on where and 
how to contribute to peacekeeping, factors that may be categorized within a more 
interest-based framework. For that reason, the second part will discuss interests as 
motivational factors, outlining several driving factors, such as security issues, 
economic interests, access to forums and powerful leaders, the importance of allies, 
and image and prestige.  
4.1 Value-based approach: applying a Weberian framework 
In Max Weber renowned lecture Politics as a Vocation it is argued that ethically 
orientated actions can be guided by two fundamentally different maxims, namely 
„ethics of conviction‟ and „ethics of responsibility.‟82 By applying to „ethics of 
conviction‟ the actor is judged purely by his or hers underlying intentions, whereas by 
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„ethics of responsibility‟ the actor is judged by the outcome.83 Although Weber 
separates the two value-based actions into different categories, this does not imply that 
both can‟t exist in the same action. The point is rather to draw attention to the principal 
justification for the action, in order to understand how the actor perceives the degree of 
success. As the following sections will show; challenges are attached to both actions, 
as ethically oriented actions may have several unintended consequences.   
4.1.1 Ethics of conviction 
Actions guided by „ethics of conviction‟ are principally viewed as a success if the 
intensions were good. Determining what is good is of course relative to the ethical 
principles one holds, depending on cultural norms, tradition, religious beliefs, etc. In 
regards to the Norwegian engagement policy, the motivations are arguably guided by 
solidarity and altruism, principles that are generally viewed as righteous. This is not to 
say that an action not guided by these principles doesn‟t qualify as good, there are of 
course endless ways to distinguish good intentions from bad. It is rather a way of 
narrowing down a comprehensive and stretched concept as „good intentions‟. When an 
act is judged purely by its intention and not its result, it creates a situation where the 
actor is excused for the consequences of the action, whether good or bad. As the 
considerations are based on the actor‟s motives, and not on the consequences of the 
action for the subject, there might occur a situation where the actor is accused of not 
being fully devoted to its subject. Basically, the result is irrelevant as long as the 
motivation was intentionally good.  
Weber refers to the ethically oriented conduct of conviction to be guided by an „ethic 
of ultimate ends.‟84 He argues that an action of good intentions that leads to bad 
results, doesn‟t necessarily have to be the actor‟s fault, but could be blamed on 
external factors or actors.  Weber‟s rationale for his argument is that „no ethic in the 
world can ignore the fact that in many cases, the achievement of „good‟ ends is 
inseparable from the use of morally dubious or at least dangerous means, that we 
cannot escape the possibility or even probability of evil side effects.‟85 The risk of 
creating counter-productive side effects is what is referred to as „unintended 
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consequences‟, where an operation that was meant so save lives, can actually create 
strong dependencies to the intervening party, and undermine local ownership. These 
undesirable outcomes are hard to predict and avoid, and must therefore be recognized 
and dealt with, before the intervention is completed. The alternative could be the 
creation of a new Somalia or Afghanistan.  
NUPI researcher Halvard Leira, refers to missions purely guided by good intentions as 
„engagement for the sake of engagement.‟86 Basically, the actor is not kind for the sake 
of being kind, but to be acknowledged for his/her efforts or to improve his/her self-
image.
87
 The dynamics of the process is thus related to the process itself, and not to the 
final result. Consequently, the actors involved in the process on the ground may not be 
aware of the reasons why they are doing what they are doing, as it is the institutional 
mechanisms such as funding and attention that become the prime ambitions.
88
 Michael 
Ignatieff has argued that operations and engagement in countries where the donors 
don‟t have the necessary motivation for long-term efforts, becomes what he terms as 
Empire Lite; „imperialism in a hurry, to spend money, to get results, to turn the place 
back to locals and get out.‟89 This is perhaps the worst form of an act based on ethics 
of convictions: when the mandate is motivated by showing support, and not including 
a plan for lasting, stable recovery, the operation becomes „too light‟ and may be 
considered as a failure by the local population. 
Even though an action based on ethics of conviction is in principle a success if the 
intentions were good, it is however important that the pure intentions are not 
suppressed or misunderstood by the audience. To this point, outside perception of the 
motivations is particularly important, and the actor will strive to present the 
motivations for the actions as altruistic and humanitarian. If he doesn‟t succeed in 
doing so, he may be accused of disguising selfish interests to gain moral return. To this 
point, human rights attorney Kenneth Roth holds that a peacekeeping operation or 
humanitarian intervention motivated by purely humanitarian grounds probably 
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couldn‟t be found.90 The reason for this claim is the inevitable realization that pressing 
new security challenges are forcing countries to prioritize the conflicts that in the 
short-term are of the most acute nature to their own safety. Presenting a peacekeeping 
operation as purely altruistic is therefore a great challenge in contemporary 
international relations.  
4.1.2 Ethics of responsibilities 
The other maxim, the „ethics of responsibility‟, de-links the motives from the politics, 
and implies that the actor who makes a political decision must also take full 
responsibility for the consequences. Weber exemplifies this by referring to a person 
who is „aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels 
such responsibility with heart and soul.‟91 By emphasizing the notion of 
„responsibility‟, politicians are made more accountable for their actions, because the 
decisions made are not based on „the mean‟ but „the end‟. The moral criteria is no 
longer the motivation and agenda, but the result. By using this line of thought, 
peacekeeping operations become more comprehensive, as the final result of the action 
is of highest importance and one may therefore be more willing to invest in the project 
until the desired objectives are achieved. The probability of success is less than in an 
intervention based on convictions, as the unforeseen pitfalls along the way are difficult 
to take into account. Nevertheless, the „ethics of responsibility‟ provides an important 
lesson in regards to peacekeeping operations: not only must the intervention 
mechanisms secure a „just cause‟ with the ultimate goal to re-establish peace, the 
devotion and commitment to stay the time it takes are just as important.  
To the interrelationship of the two maxims, Weber points to the problem of the 
justifications of means by ends, where he argues that it only has the „possibility of 
rejecting all action that employs morally dangerous means – in theory.‟92 In the case 
where one chooses to justify the use of force for the sake of peace, Weber claims that 
it is not possible to unite ethics of convictions with ethics of responsibility, because it 
is impossible to justify which end should justify which means. If peace is the ultimate 
end, then violence should not be the factor solving the problem, since violence is the 
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problem itself. For en actor applying to ethics of conviction, violence may be an 
appropriate tool, if the intention of gaining peace is the fundamental goal. For en actor 
applying to ethics of responsibility, this may not be an acceptable choice of action, 
because violence may lead to more suffering, and is thus ruining the final result. This 
does not, however, imply that ethics of convictions is the same as irresponsibility, or 
an ethic of responsibility the same as indifference to convictions, only that if one acts 
out of ethics of conviction, one cannot be evaluated on the outcome, if the intention 
was good.  
It is important to bear in mind that in Weber‟s lecture Politics as a Vocation, he does 
not consider the normative contents of politics, but focuses instead of giving a value-
free analysis of the fundamental motivations and rationales for ethically oriented 
actions. Whether one holds that altruistic intentions with an unsuccessful result is 
better than an egoistic act with greater success is thus merely a subjective opinion. 
Broadly formulated, Weber notes that „politics is made with the head, but is certainly 
not made with the head alone.‟93 He further suggests that „an ethic of [conviction] and 
an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts, but rather supplements,‟94 an 
indication that both should be present in sound politics.  
4.2 Interest-based approach: applying a realist framework 
4.2.1 Conceptual change? 
Interest is a term well used in analyses of foreign policies, and consequently there are a 
variety of ways to understand what interests may mean, and how it influences the 
political agenda. The traditional, „rather narrow way to define [interests] emphasizes 
territorial and state security and safeguarding of material interests.‟95 According to a 
report published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), „„interest-
oriented‟ foreign policy […] mean[s] a policy that systematically endeavours to further 
the welfare and security of Norwegian society and the political values on which it is 
based.‟96 As this statement shows, the traditional notions of interests are still a vital 
component of Norwegian foreign policy, but contemporary foreign politics has also 
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incorporated a wider understanding of what interests may include. This new 
understanding includes factors that are called „softer interests,‟ which contain more 
value-oriented traits. This is also exemplified in the MFA report, where it is argued 
that „pursuing ethical principles has an independent intrinsic value.‟97 Including 
„softer‟ interests with value-based traits in the foreign policy agenda may be 
supporting the notion that the post-Cold War world has taken a more holistic approach 
to foreign policy, where fundamental ethical principles and global common interests 
are given precedence. An explanatory factor for this was stated in the introductory 
chapters of this thesis, which argued that changes in the international system may lead 
to the changing character of war, which in turn lead to changes in domestic politics of 
states. Global change is also affecting Norway‟s security policy, as  
globalization introduces Norway to a new security factor: uncertainty 
through external instability. That includes threats shaped by 
international development, or events, which have a significant impact 
on Norway‟s political, economical and social interests.98  
In the Norwegian MFA report Norwegian Interests, globalization is presented as one 
of the central factors affecting Norway‟s security policy today. The authors hold that 
Norway‟s future security threats are therefore dependent on the strategies used to deal 
with the issues, as it is difficult to predict the magnitude of the changes the 
international community are facing. The concept of security is no longer strictly 
attached to state territory, but includes security in a regional and global sense, where 
national interests often coincides with common interests.
99
  
As a way to manoeuvre in an increasingly complex network of interests, foreign policy 
thus requires „a considerable degree of prioritization.‟100 The Norwegian foreign policy 
agenda is guided by a prioritization principle, which emphasizes the need to 
distinguish between the situations that are both important to Norway, where Norway is 
able to make a difference, opposed to situations where Norway can‟t contribute, or are 
not as important.
101
 This statement underscores an important fact, namely that Norway 
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has a vested interest in contributing in resolving conflicts that are not only a threat to 
human security, but also has a relatively high probability of success, both to uphold 
Norway‟s self-image as a „peace-maker‟ and strengthen our role on the international 
arena.  
The interest-based motives are therefore two-folded: national interests include the 
basic notions of realist theory such as national security and economic interests, and the 
importance of how allies and international organization perceive Norway. To the latter 
point, it is also critical that Norway supports other countries in their peacekeeping 
missions so that they eventually will return the favour if Norway ever need their 
assistance – thus strengthening Norway‟s future national security. Moreover, it can be 
argued that all national interests are inter-linked to support the same goal. This thesis 
will, however, support the claim that national interests are affecting traditional value-
based areas, constituting a trend towards a more covert peacekeeping agenda, where 
national interests are affecting the motivations in new ways.  
4.2.2 Security 
Security has traditionally been perceived as the most important element of a state‟s 
foreign policy agenda. But as previous sections have illustrated: Western state‟s are 
now relating to new types of threats, and consequently having to change the traditional 
strategies on how to obtain state security. Peacekeeping operations, however, is a type 
of military operations that isn‟t necessarily deployed to enhance national security. 
However, as previously mentioned, national interests – in many cases national security 
– is nevertheless affecting the decision-making process of engaging in peace 
operations. The security-factor may motivate the policy-makers to contribute to 
peacekeeping in conflict areas where peace and stability might have a positive effect 
on national security. Professor of International Relations, David Chandler describes 
this rationale by stating that peacekeeping is characterized by a „lack of strategic 
concern with large areas of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa.‟102 By this, 
Chandler is simply claiming that the sub-Saharan African region lacks the important 
strategic element of security to make it interesting for Western states to invest 
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resources in peacebuilding efforts. Instead, military troops are rather placed in conflict 
areas that have more relevance to the national security of states. This assertion leads to 
a more thorough study of how security concerns affects the considerations of where to 
place peacekeeping efforts?  
The short answer to this question is that security issues following 9/11 have 
undoubtedly shaped the political agenda of the Western world. In the article The 
Responsibility to Protect: is anyone interested in humanitarian intervention? the 
authors argue that it is „necessary to marshal evidence for the redefinition of [the great 
powers‟] short-term and long-term national interests.‟103 This implies that 
contemporary foreign politics of the Western world are mainly focused on the 
immediate threats to their national security. Immediate threats are referring to the 
direct and sometimes obvious consequences of not interfering in a conflict, such as 
increased migration or escalated criminality in neighbouring countries. Another aspect 
of the new the conflicts are of course the direct threat perceived by civilians in 
Western states following terrorist attacks on national soil such as suicide bombings.  
Although such violent acts occur in a relatively small degree, it affects the sense of 
security felt by the population, thus stimulating Western governments to provide 
resources to national preventive measures as well as security efforts in countries 
hosting terrorist. Consequently, the areas that receive the most attention are the ones 
that propose the greatest and most direct threat, such as the war in Afghanistan. The 
case is much more difficult to make for more remote conflicts, such as Sudan or the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The security issue may be the factor that separates the 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq from the non-interventions in Rwanda, Sudan 
and Kenya. Precisely because the latter countries don‟t pose a great threat to 
international peace and security, the Western countries can „afford‟ to leave the 
responsibility to the African Union. The same argument can work the other way 
around, as the conflicts in the Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan are too „dangerous‟ to let 
the Middle East handle on their own.  
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The „Copenhagen School‟ of International Relations theory has drawn attention to the 
increase in resources, by politicians, policy makers and security professionals, to 
processes of „securitization‟. The term is used to describe the way such actors use 
security to „compete for visibility, influence and scarce resources‟104 on the national 
arena. This term highly relates to the self-interest of the states, as issues on the 
political agenda receive more attention the more they pose as a danger to state 
security. Framing political issues as threats to national security, the focus is thus on the 
consequences of the state of not intervening or reacting to situation at hand, and less 
on the consequences for the fragile state. This way of „selling‟ military operations may 
have consequences for the outcome of the mission: If the underlying motive for 
stabilizing a region is the fear of the violent groups spreading members and ideas, the 
mission is completed when those groups are disarmed, or caught „dead or alive‟ – a 
policy pursued by President Bush since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.  
When security aspects become high priority on the foreign policy agenda, the motives 
of a peacekeeping operation are subsequently blurred. The methods applied by 
terrorists, such as suicide bombings and kidnapping, are creating fear in countries that 
not necessarily are in danger of attacks. Nevertheless, public fear motivates policy-
makers to grant funding to military operations where such violations take place. 
Consequently, peacekeeping operations might be perceived, or „sold‟ to the public, as 
ways of enhancing national security. If the intention of a peacekeeping operation is to 
enhance stability in a war-torn country, it is of vital importance that a distinct mandate 
for the operation is in place, and subsequently communicated to the audience.  
4.2.3 The importance of allies 
Alliances are commonly understood as joint efforts to enhance national security, 
between two or several sovereign states.
105
 According to Stephen M. Walt, such 
collaborations may be formal or informal, but will always include a certain level of 
commitment, and expectations of reciprocity. The concept of reciprocity reflects a 
relationship consisting of a mutual exchange of support and assistance between states, 
where it is expected that the other party will return the favour in the same manner that 
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it is given.  Being a member of an alliance does therefore involve a responsibility to 
assist allies by providing extensive resources, which in turn will affect the political 
considerations of whether a state will benefit from the membership. According to 
Walt, this decision making process will be affected by the evaluations concerning the 
aggregated power of the allies, including population and military capacity, 
geographical closeness, and offensive power – the ability to attack enemies without 
great costs.
106
  
In every alliance there will almost always exist a skewed balance of power, as small 
states would seek alliances with greater powers in order to secure protection from 
external threats. Such relationships will in turn lead to dependencies, where the smaller 
states are reliant on benevolence of the greater powers, and will strive to maintain their 
position by offering other services besides the military assistance expected from the 
greater powers. Walt argues that strategies pursued by smaller states in order to stay 
closely connected with the leaders of the alliance, may include respectfulness and 
loyalty to the alliance, which in turn strengthens the leaders ability to maximise their 
self-interests.
107
   
According to Professor of International Conflict Studies, Øyvind Østerud, the 
Norwegian participation in international military operations have „one open and one 
hidden card‟. By using this approach, one can understand the Norwegian contributions 
as both inspired by the willingness to support peacekeeping commitment in general, 
and also as a way to persuade „our powerful allies‟ that we are willing and able to 
contribute to a joint campaign, and in that sense „deserves help if we are ever in 
trouble ourselves.‟108 This assumption underscores the marriage of values and national 
interests, and how they can be combined in shaping the Norwegian peacekeeping 
agenda. Even though the main objective of a peacekeeping operation is to contribute to 
stability and change, Norway‟s national security interests are maintained by investing 
in relationships with more powerful allies. For a more thorough understanding of the 
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Norwegian commitment to such alliances, it is useful to take a closer look at the 
history of Norway‟s alliances.  
The Second World War demonstrated the importance of powerful allies, and how they 
contribute in times of trouble. Unlike Sweden, who remained neutral during the war, 
Norway became a member of NATO at its establishment in 1949, and has 
continuously showed its commitment to the organization. The latest example is the 
contribution to the NATO troops in Afghanistan, ISAF; which in many ways also 
shows a clear support and commitment to Norway‟s powerful allies, USA and UK. 
Norway also joined the UN at its creation, and the first UN Secretary-General, Trygve 
Lie, was Norwegian. The unceasing engagement in these organizations has proven 
Norway to be a commitment member, which can be trusted as a loyal partner to 
powerful countries like the US and the UK. Norway benefits from this loyalty of being 
an active member by getting access to international decision makers and arenas. The 
Minister of Foreign of Affairs, Gahr Støre, holds that increased access to central actors 
in the US can be regarded as Norwegian security interest, and a way to promote issues 
that have a direct significance for Norway.
109
 Access in this regard can be defined as 
both an interest in itself, and as a mean to reach other objectives.
110
 Whether access to 
important forums has been a direct consequence of Norway‟s peacebuilding diplomacy 
is difficult to determine and will not be discussed in this thesis.  
4.2.4 Image and prestige  
The concept of prestige is often used to describe something that induces respect or 
admiration. In relation to foreign politics, one may associate this with an act that leads 
to peace or change within a certain field or region. Professor of Political Science, K. J. 
Holsti defines prestige as the following: „There is no precise meaning to these terms as 
applied to the relations between states, but let us simply use them in a common sense 
way: Political associations seek to generate deference, respect and sometimes awe 
among others.‟111 Arguably, there is an underlying and well-defined „national identity‟ 
based on Norway being a nation of peace. Even though the Norwegian commitment on 
the ground has been almost absent since the 1960‟s, the financial contribution to 
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peacekeeping, as well as meditation efforts in Sri Lanka and the Middle East, has 
contributed to the creation of what is commonly referred to as a peace engagement.  
The branding of Norway based on its commitment to peace constitutes a vital part of 
the national identity, and functions as a point of departure for the political 
considerations concerning peacekeeping operations. Further, articulating a 
commitment to peace is not only affecting Norway‟s self-image, being a promoter of 
peace and reconciliation has undoubtedly also marked Norway‟s reputation on the 
international scene. Branding, visibility and reputation are important ingredients for a 
small country to get access to important arenas and events. The IFS report Interests in 
the Norwegian Engagement Policy, argues that „status and prestige may give a state a 
certain sort of power through what the political scientist Joseph Nye describes as „soft 
power.‟112  
According to Professor Joseph Nye, „soft power‟ is what „rests on the ability to shape 
the preferences of others,‟113 thus the ability to persuade your opponent or enemy 
without having to resort to threats of violence. Nye argues that a country‟s ability to 
manage the persuasive „softer‟ power proceeds from the following: „its culture (in 
places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at 
home and abroad), and its foreign politics (when they are seen as legitimate and 
having moral authority).‟114 In other words, to attain status and prestige on the 
international arena, a country‟s foreign policies must not contradict its political values, 
which again should reflect the nation‟s general culture. Applied to Norway, the peace 
engagement should be rooted in the Norwegian culture – a tradition of peace, and must 
be promoted in a way that inspires authority and legitimacy.  A more thorough 
discussion on the debatable issue of whether Norway is in possession of such a peace 
tradition will be presented in Chapter 5, but it can nevertheless be noted that Norway 
has a distinct ambition to be perceived as a nation of peace. Whether the efforts of 
branding of Norway as a „humanitarian superpower‟ has been a tactical strategy to 
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increase its „soft‟ power will be discussed in the following section concerning how 
interests and values intertwine.  
4.2.5 Necessity versus generating success rate 
The final interest-based motivational factor introduced in this chapter involves the 
political considerations regarding the necessity of contributing to a peacekeeping 
operation opposed to the chances of generating success. In other words: the two 
variables are significant to the decision-makers; (a) the so-called „need‟-factor, 
concerning the situation of the recipient country, and (b) the „risk‟-factor, meaning the 
chances of the donor country succeeding in its mission. When aiming to grasp the 
motivational framework for engaging in peacekeeping operations, the so-called „need‟ 
factor may seem rather obvious, but should nevertheless be discussed: in today‟s world 
there are internal conflicts that are so critical and acute that national interests are 
downplayed in the considerations of whether or not to contribute to peace and stability.  
It must, however, be emphasized that as much as there are examples of less acute 
conflicts that have gained great international attention and assistance, there are also 
more acute conflicts where the international community has remained relatively 
passive. This is often explained by the concept of selectivity; a component of national 
interests motivating the decision of where to place the efforts. The concept of 
selectivity is therefore used to explain how countries will invest resources in 
peacebuilding in areas that are affected by conflict, and which in addition are of a 
certain interest; being political, economy or security related. Although assistance to 
war-torn conflicts in many cases is guided by solidarity and altruism, or in this case: 
motivated by need and necessity, these variables will often be accompanied with more 
strategic elements. This leads to the second factor initially introduced, namely the 
ability for the donor country to generate success, or the opposite: the possibility of 
loosing more than they invested – constituting the risk factor.  Moreover, when 
deciding where to place peacekeeping efforts, there is a question of the amount of 
resources the contributor must deploy in order to generate success, which in this regard 
is peace and stability in the affected area.  
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As argued by Bellamy, the new and extended tasks of peacekeeping operations do 
indeed affect the willingness of states to involve their troops in such operations. For 
example, the operation in Afghanistan has surely lasted longer than many NATO 
states expected, has required more resources and has caused more public debate than 
first assumed. Whether or not this will affect the willingness of states to again involve 
troops in such complex matters is yet to be seen, but as proven in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it is of vital importance to have a clear and well-rooted objective for such 
comprehensive operations, both to the civil population in the conflict states, but also to 
gain or retain popular support at home. The danger of „losing face‟ to their own 
population and allies by engaging in an unsuccessful operation is too dangerous for 
many governments, and it is thus safer to refrain from engaging at all. On the other 
hand, the argument can work the other way as well, as the probability of success may 
increase the willingness to states to participate, in order to increase the completion rate 
of operations, and thus improve their reputation as a contributor to peace and stability. 
This may lead to a situation where states prefer to invest resources in the „softer‟ types 
of conflict, where they anticipate good results without investing a great amount of 
resources.  
Combined, the two factors emphasize the need for governments to mark success and 
results to the public, and also demonstrate the importance of contributing to conflict 
resolution and peacekeeping. According to political advisor to the Norwegian 
government, Liv Tørres, the choice of where to contribute is thus based on the 
following factors: legitimacy (the conflict must be acute), former alliances (where 
loyalty may strengthen national security), a request from the parties of a Norwegian 
„safe heaven‟ (invitations to contribute makes it more legitimate) and the absence of 
business interests or national interests (which also strengthens the legitimacy of the 
contribution).
115
 Engaging in conflicts where these factors are in place will thus 
strengthen the Norwegian profile as a both a strategic and humanitarian actor. This 
merger of necessity and will to succeed is perhaps what Knut Frydenlund predicted in 
his renowned book from 1983, Lille land – hva nå, where he argued that „idealism – as 
the peace and engagement policy is an expression of, will conflict with national 
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interests in new ways.‟116 Exactly how these assumable opposing variables may 
conflict is of special interest to the following section, discussing how interests and 
values intertwine.  
4.3 The relationship between interests and values  
4.3.1 How interests and values intertwine  
In his book Development, Security and Unending War, Professor of Development 
Politics, Mark Duffield states the following: The moral and ethical imperative of 
developing countries and fragile states‟ right to move from poverty and conflict to 
prosperity and stability, may also be a political imperative: tackling poverty and 
instability which may lead to civil wars, will again lead to failed states and safe havens 
for terrorists – thus increasing global instability and insecurity.117 Duffield‟s statement 
illustrates how ethics and values such as altruism and solidarity are companied by 
more strategic security concerns relating to the self-interest of states‟. Duffield gives a 
value-free analysis in the sense that he does not conclude that the relationship between 
interests and values necessary produces negative results. Rather, it is a way of 
demonstrating that states‟ incentives to „do good‟ can partly be motivated by more 
strategic motivations. Moreover, Duffield argues that interests, especially national 
security, are decisive driving factors for why states engage in peacekeeping operations. 
Both interest-based factors such as „risk‟ and „consequences‟, as well as more value-
based factors like „need‟ and „necessity‟, are all part of the decision-making 
framework. In the words of Duffield: political considerations are not only guided by 
the „moral duty of effective states to protect and better the lives of people living within 
ineffective ones, but such help also strengthens national security.‟118  
A similar reasoning is articulated in the 2009 Government Proposition Interests, 
responsibilities and opportunities,
119
 where it is stated that: 
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Security shall provide for the individual citizen's physical integrity and 
protection from abuse by foreign powers. At the same time it must seek to 
safeguard the liberal rule of law and human rights that is essential to 
preserve peace between countries and to prevent radicalism and conflict in 
many parts of the world. Poverty reduction and contribution to positive 
social development in Africa or the Middle East is rooted in international 
solidarity, but it is also necessary to ensure the global social web of which 
Norway is deeply dependent on.
120
 
If there is a tendency towards a merger of interests and values affecting decisions 
concerning peacekeeping operations, it makes it increasingly difficult to recognize one 
clear set of motivational factors – and also mapping out the wanted outcome for the 
engagement. Are national interests placed „under‟ or „next to‟ the value-based motives, 
or has foreign policy, and thus peacekeeping operations, expanded to what Professor 
Janne Haaland Matlary coins as „value-diplomacy‟?121 To Matlary, value-diplomacy is 
contrasting realpolitik, which relates to the traditional notions of national interests, 
where security issues and economic interests take precedence. Value-diplomacy, on 
the other hand, has arguably been developed independent of strategic thinking, and is 
rather ascribed to the personal efforts of individuals, coincidences and requests from 
external actors.
122
 It refers to the part of the foreign policy portfolio that includes 
„peace mediation, peace operations, aid, state building, democracy, human rights work, 
both multilateral and bilateral.‟123 In that sense, value-diplomacy refers to the same 
elements of foreign affairs as the engagement policy, although the latter also includes 
environmental issues.  
In the article A strategic analysis of the Norwegian foreign politics, Matlary analyses 
the relationship between value-diplomacy and realpolitik in Norwegian foreign policy. 
Matlary holds that „any value may be an interest if one specifies how the value should 
be promoted, interests are very often values as well, such as international justice, 
equality, peace, etc.‟124 By pursuing this line of thought, one may get the impression 
that there is no divide between interest and values, because both can be explained 
within the framework of interests. Furthermore, Professor Matlary claims that 
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politicians prefer to talk about values when discussing foreign policy because they 
escape the analysis, criticism and requirements to prioritize. A more nuanced approach 
to the relationship between interests and values in Norwegian foreign policy is offered 
in Matlary‟s three types of foreign policy decision-makers. The activist enhances a 
„value-diplomacy‟ without strategic ideas of how he might translate values and ideals 
into „harder‟ power. The strategic activist, however, is aware of how international 
relations are affected by visibility and reputation, thus using his „soft power‟ as an 
instrument in international politics. The actor guided by realpolitik is indeed 
knowledgeable on how „soft power‟ may enhance visibility, and thus uses this „capital‟ 
to promote national interests through a strategic holistic thinking.
125
 By applying this 
three-folded model onto Norwegian foreign policy, Matlary aims to discover the 
relationship between strategic thinking and „value-diplomacy‟. Moreover, the study 
interviewed central actors within Norwegian foreign politics, and asked whether they 
perceived strategic thinking as the basis for the value-based foreign policy, and if they 
reflected upon how power attained through „value-diplomacy‟ might translate into real 
political power.
126
 The study concludes that strategic thinking has not yet affected the 
relationship between „value-diplomacy‟ and realpolitik,127 in the sense that the values 
such as a peace image, has not been used as a strategy to attain power and prestige. It 
notes, however, that the relationship between „value-diplomacy‟ and realpolitik is 
changing, and several interviewees call for a more insightful approach to the two 
elements of foreign policy.
128
  
Further findings of the study suggests that the engagement policy has to some extent 
given Norway a reputation as a „peace activist‟, which arguably has the danger of 
labelling Norway as a nation without strong national interests, characterized by its 
values alone.
129
 Consequently, the perception of Norway is as an actor that is not 
feared, nor included in international strategic planning. The study emphasizes that 
Norway must manage the art of balancing realpolitik and value-diplomacy, in order to 
use its image as an instrument to enhance a closer relationship with European 
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governments. By using values as a way to enhance national interests, one may be 
perceived as cynical, which in turn may ruin the credibility of the peace engagement. 
For that reason, value-diplomacy should always be considered as an expression of 
genuine commitment. Even though this study was undertaken to reveal the guiding 
principles of Norwegian foreign policy agenda, the framework may be transferable to 
the peacekeeping agenda, and deserves a closer investigation in the analysis part of 
this thesis. 
4.3.2 Why distinguish between interests and ideals?  
Even though peacekeeping operations undoubtedly is coloured by solidarity and 
altruism – one is willing to risk the lives of national troops to secure the lives of 
strangers, it has been argued that in many cases national interests are present as 
motivational factors as well. As argued by scholars, this isn‟t necessarily a problem: 
the strategic and national-interest aspects of a peacekeeping operation don‟t have to be 
counterproductive to achieving peace and security in a war-torn country. Whether or 
not the underlying motives are based on the desire to secure the region, acquire new 
allies or show support for an organization or institution doesn‟t have to affect the true 
efforts of the peacekeeping troops. What is important is a clearly defined agenda. In 
the words of the American diplomat Chester A. Crocker; „in order to know the 
limitations and possibilities for peace engagement in conflict areas, one must know the 
national motives for the operation.‟130 
To assess whether the Norwegian contribution to the mission in Chad was a success or 
a failure, the premises of the commitment must be clearly established. Although the 
contribution to MINURCAT had a precise mission and a timeframe, it is less obvious 
what were the intentions of the Norwegian government when committing to the 
operation. As argued by Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, assessing the Norwegian peace 
policy is important for the following reasons: Norwegian voters must know why the 
government spend money and political capital in processes where the outcome is 
uncertain and risky. Second, the population of the war-torn society must know why, on 
what grounds, they should trust Norway and their contributions to peacebuilding. To 
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accomplish this, the Norwegian diplomats must be familiar with the concepts and 
beliefs that make up the foundation of Norwegian peace policy.
131
 For that, it must be 
clear in what sense the peace policy springs from idealism and solidarity, or a strategic 
framework based on interests and national security, or to what extent the two 
motivational factors are interlinked.  
4.3.3 A shift towards value-led policy-making? 
In his book Hollow Hegemony, Professor of International Relations, David Chandler, 
discards the notion that the post-Cold War can be explained by a shift away from 
nation state and interest-based policy-making to globalised and value-based 
approaches.
132
 In his opinion, the conceptions of the contemporary world has been 
dominated by an overall accepted notion that power is no longer related to territorial 
hegemony, but rather projected as value-led acts: 
It would seem that the Cold War world of realpolitik, where territorial 
interests of state security were considered primary, has been 
transformed into post-Cold War world of globalised, values-led policy-
making in which security has been redefined in terms which see the 
security of regions of the world as interdependent, rather than 
conflicting priorities, and the issues of concern extend away from 
threats in the military sphere to internal questions of democracy, good 
governance and relief from poverty.
133
 
To Chandler, explaining contemporary international relations by the rather narrow 
categories of interests and values, and thus claiming there has been a shift from the one 
to the other, one neglects to investigate the reasons for such a shift. Chandler‟s 
argument holds that instead of applying a realist approach to understand the Cold War 
era, and idealist or constructivist approaches to explain the contemporary world, one 
must investigate the gap between the social and political context and the „discursive 
forms in which power is projected internationally.‟134  
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For Chandler, there is a clear lack of „long-term strategic policy-making,‟135 which he 
explains by a lack of „political responsibility when interventions are made.‟136 By 
phrasing intervention within a value-based framework, politicians apply to „ethics of 
convictions‟ where they are judged by their motives, and not by the results. Chandler 
argues that „western elites seems to be more interested in policy declarations of intent 
than practical outcomes,‟137 thus widening the gap between means and ends. In sum, 
the asserted shift towards value-led decision-making is, for Chandler, an easy way to 
escape responsibility and long-term commitment. If this argument stands, why are 
interventions initiated in the first place? Chandler‟s answer to this is inspired by Zaki 
Laïdi‟s notion of a „world without meaning,‟138 where the western powers experienced 
a loss of importance and power on the international scene after the end of the Cold 
War. Chandler‟s understanding of the Western countries reactions to the lack of 
influence in the contemporary world is what he refers to as hollow hegemony, where 
the idealized policy discourse and practices rather reflect the „hollowing-out of the 
traditional frameworks of meaning which reflect and structured western power.‟139 
Interventions are thus understood as a way to maintain some sort of position on the 
international arena, by creating an image as a responsible and morally grounded 
capacity.  
In sum, Chandler refrains from characterizing Western states‟ policy-making as either 
interest-based or value-based. Instead, he argues that there is a lack of strategy and 
tactics in Western states‟ foreign policy agenda, caused by a lack of motivation and 
intensity in contemporary international politics. This intensity was what characterized 
the Cold War era, an era where it was justifiable to have an outspoken interest-based 
strategy. Today‟s threats to Western states‟ cannot be compared to the imminent 
danger of a nuclear war, nor are the conflicts in remote areas able to bring about public 
involvement. The foreign policy of Western states is simply in a vacuum, where no 
threat is so dangerous that they have to act, and no conflict is so acute that they want 
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to act. Instead, they are often half-hearted committed to an operation, lacking the 
motivation and stamina needed to create long-term stability and peace.  
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CHAPTER 5. THE NORWEGIAN COMMITMENT TO PEACE 
 
Being a small nation in the outskirts of Europe has proved to be both a challenge and 
an advantage. Without the strong political power of the greater countries, Norway 
must employ other methods to be noticed on the international scene. As Chapter 4 
illustrated, employing new types of „soft‟ power, countries attain prestige and 
authority through its morally grounded actions and its ability to persuade opponents 
without resorting to violent means. To Norway‟s benefit, such traits have proved to be 
increasingly relevant in international politics. However, as stated in the opening 
section of this thesis: „If perceptions of Norway that influence foreign policy turn out 
to have little basis in reality, our foreign policy may well fail to reflect our real 
interests.‟140 Essentially, Norway likes to paint its actions in the colour of values, as it 
creates an image of a „tolerant, peace-loving and egalitarian country.‟141 However, as 
the former statement put forward: the Norwegian image as a „humanitarian 
superpower‟ is perhaps hiding the deeper reality of an outline drawn by interests. In 
order to get an exhaustive understanding of Norway‟s self-images, the following 
chapter will conduct a study of the Norwegian engagement policy and the commitment 
to peace, focusing on the motivational factors outlined by official documents and 
independent reports by Norwegian research institutes.  
5.1 Self-images in a globalised world 
Norway‟s international engagement policy is a term initially coined by the Norwegian 
historian Rolf Tamnes and includes the promotion of peacebuilding, environmental 
issues, human rights, development and aid.
142
 Foreign Minister Gahr Støre explains the 
motivational factors for the engagement policy to be the global common interests, 
Norwegian self-interests, access to important actors and forums, as well as protection 
of certain values,
143
 such as democracy and human rights. The premises for these 
ambitious objectives are grounded on the notions that Norway is a small country 
without the difficult legacy of being a colonial power, and its location in a peaceful 
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part of the world, factors that supposedly obligates Norway to contribute to 
development and peacekeeping processes.
144
 The Norwegian engagement policy is a 
highly debated issue in contemporary political science, but due to the necessity of a 
narrowed focus, this sections will not provide an in depth description of this subject 
matter. However, it is viewed as critical to the validity of this thesis to provide a brief 
summary of the part of the engagement policy that involves peace and peacebuilding, 
the so-called commitment to peace, along with a short history of the peace tradition, 
and a discussion of the various explanations of the motivational factors for the 
Norwegian peacebuilding efforts. 
When studying the Norwegian commitment to peace there are two distinct features 
that are consistent throughout the readings; firstly that Norway is a small country, and 
secondly; that Norway is a country dedicated to peace and stability. The two features 
are not much debated, as the former is indisputable, and the latter seems to be an 
opinion well rooted in the so-called Norwegian peace tradition. In order to obtain an 
inclusive understanding of the Norwegian commitment to peace, it is worthwhile to 
take a step back and consider the origin of this concept, and why it is often presented 
as something inherent in the Norwegian political culture. In the early 1900‟s, former 
Norwegian Prime Minister, Jørgen Løvland, was the first to articulate the Norwegian 
peace oriented manifest of foreign affairs, stating that Norway should abstain from 
participating in alliances that could eventually lead to wars.
145
 Former Foreign 
Minister Halvdan Koht reinforced this declaration in 1936, articulating the Norwegian 
objective as the following: 
We are a small nation, and our voice will not reach far, but 
nonetheless we would always cry, almost as loud as we can, cry out 
that we want and need to work for peace. It is our wish; because we 
want peace and that there shall be peace in the world.
146
 
The quote reflects the inevitable realization that Norway will never become a great 
nation in territorial terms, but will nevertheless take on the great responsibility of 
promoting peace internationally, sentiments that are continuously present in 
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contemporary Norwegian foreign politics. The mission has thus been to encourage 
other nations to cooperate and work to achieve peaceful settlements, a responsibility 
that seems to be rooted in an accepted idea of Norway‟s duties being a small, 
developed country with a well-functioning democracy, a strong civil society and a 
modern history free of conquest and imperialism.  
What has changed, however, is in what ways Norway should work to succeed in this 
mission. In the article Norge – en fredsnasjon?, NUPI research fellow Halvard Leira 
outlines how the strategies for the peace engagement have changed from the early 
1900‟s liberalistic world views of laizzes faire and international law, through the 
1950‟s established confidence in the UN, to the contemporary ideas of Norway‟s more 
direct contribution to reconciliation and mediation processes.
147
 Leira‟s argument 
holds that the notion of Norway as a peace nation has moved from being a vague and 
latent idea, to a more outspoken purposive concept characterizing contemporary 
Norwegian foreign politics. Today, there is a confident belief in the advantages of 
being a small country located in the outskirts of Europe, because it provides the ability 
to comment „the system from the outside and change it for the better.‟148  
5.1.2 Motivations for the engagement policy and the commitment to peace 
As a self-declared nation of peace, Norway has not only been participating in a 
number of peace and reconciliation processes, but also been a dedicated supporter of 
UN peacekeeping operations. The Norwegian commitment to peace is a vital 
component of the engagement policy, and a continuation of the overall efforts to 
enhance democracy, human rights, conflict resolution and peace. The outspoken 
rationale for the Norwegian commitment to peace is arguably that Norway is one of the 
wealthiest countries in the world, and therefore has a „distinct responsibility to 
contribute where we can,‟149 an attitude that supposedly work as an asset for gaining a 
notable position as a „humanitarian superpower‟ in international politics.150 The 2003 
Norwegian Official Report (NOU) Power and Democracy explains the ability of 
branding Norway as a humanitarian superpower by the abovementioned rather 
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peaceful history and location, stating that using „idealism as a trademark would be 
more difficult for a country with greater political power capability and tradition.‟151 
Once more, the properties of geography and history are highlighted as explanatory 
factors for why Norway can manage the onerous vocation of committing to peace. 
What remains to discuss is why Norwegian governments continuously choose to take 
on such great responsibilities? 
An explanation to why Norway aims to be acknowledged as a „humanitarian 
superpower‟ is provided by the NOU Power and Democracy, stating that effort of 
introducing Norway as an international brand connected to peace, is part of a strategy 
to adapt to the new international conditions following the last decades of increased 
globalization.
152
 This explanation is in line with the arguments made in the 
introductory chapters of this thesis, namely that contemporary threats to international 
peace and security go far beyond aggression by states, and include poverty, civil war, 
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and transnational organized crime. As threats 
to the nation-state have increasingly been globalised, the security strategies applied to 
cope with such threats are increasingly globalised as well. This means that negotiating 
peace and decisions to engage in peacekeeping operations are placed in international 
forums, where small states like Norway have little decision-making power and 
influence. The commitment to peace has thus become a way of gaining international 
acceptance and respect, whereby contributions to the UN‟s peacekeeping efforts 
appears as a favourable arena for the vocation.  
Another argument to why Norway is so distinctly dedicated to peace relates to the 
abovementioned bi-effects of contributing to UN peacekeeping efforts, where the 
crucial element of state security is enhanced by securing peace in war-torn countries. 
This two-folded consequence of participating in peacekeeping is firstly connected to 
the outspoken solid confidence in the UN as the primary responsible for international 
peace and security. As articulated by Foreign Minister Gahr Støre: „the support to the 
UN peacekeeping operations is one of the most important as well as the most 
demanding and complex tasks […] and the methods for participation and support must 
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constantly be updated.‟153 As the UN first and foremost is dedicated to obtain peace 
and security; the main objective for Norwegian engagement in UN operations is to 
secure the lives of the people living in the countries where the operations take place. 
Second, peacekeeping operations will always have a regional, and sometimes global 
element, where peacekeeping efforts in a country increase international security, thus 
increasing Norway‟s national security. For that reason it is only to be expected that the 
Norwegian Ministry of Affairs acknowledges this important component as a 
motivational factor. This line of reasoning may appear rather obvious, but is 
nevertheless important to underscore: A purely altruistic peacekeeping operation will 
never take place, as the globalised world of today will always experience the 
consequences of political and social turmoil in other countries, whether it leads to 
increased immigration, the need for assistance in various ways, or the spread of radical 
ideas such as religious extremism. It must however be noted that there are also 
conflicts so remote, or with a distinct local character, which will never directly affect 
Norway‟s national security. Nevertheless, in sum, there will almost always be a 
strategic component to every humanitarian effort, as the bi-effects of peacekeeping 
will generally have a positive effect on states‟ security.  
As argued in the latter section, the idea that Norway is a nation of peace, is more or 
less the same as it was to former Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht who argued that 
Norway would „cry out that we want and need to work for peace‟. At the same time; 
the branding of Norway as a peace nation has become more important for the 
reputation on the international arena, and is therefore placed higher on the foreign 
political agenda. To this point, Leira is curious to where motivation for this 
acknowledged commitment to peace actually springs? According to him, the common 
reply to this question is that Norway is promoting peace because of the Norwegian 
peace tradition. Leira, however, challenges this accepted notion by stating that „the 
more precise answer is perhaps to say that Norway is a peace nation because we have 
tradition of having a peace tradition, to perceive ourselves as peace nation.‟154 Being a 
nation of peace because there is a certain peace tradition is not a solid explanation if 
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Norway lacks a history of peace efforts and experiences needed in order to claim such 
a tradition. If the Norwegian peace tradition is more present in theory than in practice, 
the rationale for the Norwegian commitment to peace must be explained by something 
other than „this is the way it has always been‟. 
When attempting to analyze the motivational factors and explanations for the 
Norwegian commitment to peace, it is important to separate the various elements of 
peacekeeping efforts, as different operations may be grounded on different rationales. 
For example may the national interests and strategic concerns play a larger part in the 
decision making process of fighting terrorism, than for example in the efforts to 
establish peace in a war-torn African country. However, in general, peacekeeping 
efforts are usually explained by value-based factors such as altruism and solidarity, 
and the justifications for engaging in peacekeeping operations are generally embedded 
within a larger framework of international humanitarian law.  
The Norwegian government has a rather broad and inclusive objective when 
participating in peacekeeping operations: both to strengthen national security, and 
„simultaneously contribute to international peace and stability, increased respect for 
human rights, and enforcing the purpose and principles of the UN-Charter.‟155 This 
illustrates how peacekeeping is an arena where values and national interests are 
merged, combining national security and humanitarian aspirations. It is important to 
underscore that even though strategic interests and security are unavoidable parts of 
foreign policy agenda, and subsequently the commitment to peace, the outspoken 
agenda ordinarily emphasizes values as the primary framework of motivational factors 
for engaging in peacekeeping operations. Based on this, the analysis part of this thesis 
will investigate to what extent values were used as motivations for the peacekeeping 
mission in Chad, and whether Max Weber‟s terms of ethics of conviction and ethics of 
responsibility have explanatory power to the Norwegian contribution to, and the 
withdrawal from, MINURCAT.  
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5.2 General trends of Norwegian peacekeeping operations 
In the Norwegian context, international military operations are commonly separated 
into two main categories: Article 5 operations and international peacekeeping 
operations. Both types of operations can be categorized as peace enforcement, with an 
overall objective to restore peace and security. Examples of peace enforcement 
operations are the 1999 NATO military operation in the former Yugoslavia and the 
ongoing US-led military operation in Afghanistan.
156
 Article 5 operations refer to 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, also equivalent to UN Article 51, and may be 
invoked in situations of self-defence. In addition, such operations embody the 
principle that an attack against a member of the Alliance is considered as an attack 
against all.
157
  
International peacekeeping operations, also referred to as „non-Article 5 operations,‟158 
are not used as a mechanism to secure a nation‟s own territory or as self-defence, but 
rather to create the conditions for lasting peace in war-torn countries. Such operations 
are usually led by the UN and are based on a UN mandate.
159
 In contrast to 
peacekeeping operations; military operations under Article 5 are not part of the 
Norwegian engagement policy, and therefore, this thesis will not elaborate any further 
on this particular subject matter. The focus of this section will rather be on the 
Norwegian contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, including a discussion of the 
motivational framework for such efforts.  
According to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence; the international peacekeeping 
operations are often categorized according to intensity, complexity or „generation‟ – 
relating to the different periods in time the operation took place. „First generation‟ 
operations refer to the classical missions like the operations in Lebanon and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, where the main ambition was to restore peace. 
„Second generation‟ operations refer to the more complex operations, which include 
political, economical and humanitarian efforts, like the operations in Cambodia and El 
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Salvador, where Norway contributed from 1992-1993.
160
 „Third generation‟ operations 
also include elements of peace enforcement, such as the operations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Somalia.
161
  
The Ministry of Defence presents operations ranging from the relatively less intense 
deployment of preventive action and military missions to observe, to the more intense 
forms such as peace keeping, peace enforcement, peace support operations and 
humanitarian intervention.
162
 This way of classifying operations is similar to 
Bellamy‟s previously mentioned typology, illustrating how the complexity and 
intensity of an operation varies from the different ways to manage peace. Although the 
typologies are useful ways to categorize peacekeeping operations, it must be noted that 
when applied to the real world, the different types of operations incorporate elements 
from each other, making the distinctions less noticeable.   
According to the Principles for Norwegian participation in international peacekeeping 
operations outlined by the Ministry of Defence; the Norwegian government‟s position 
is that „Norway should in principle be prepared to contribute to all of the 
abovementioned types of international military operations, provided that we possess 
the adequate forces needed.‟163 It is further underscored that that the operation is in 
line with the following criterion:  Compliance between the required contribution from 
the forces on the ground, and the mandate given the force, the rules of engagement and 
the equipment available to complete the task.
164
 This statement is in accordance with 
the Norwegian prioritization principle; considering not only the normative question of 
where Norway should contribute, but also distinguishing between what is important 
and where Norway can make a difference, opposed to situations where it is more 
difficult to make a contribution and that are not as important.
165
 The main objective is 
thus that the operation is manageable for the Norwegian forces and important for 
national security.  
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5.2.1 Norway’s peacekeeping experiences 
The Norwegian commitment to the UN began in 1949, when five Norwegian military 
officers were sent to monitor the truce between India and Pakistan. Since then, 
Norway has been a devoted UN member by several contributions to the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) since its establishment in 1956, and was for a long 
period one of the main contributors to UN peacekeeping operations.
166
 Initially, the 
Norwegian peacekeeping efforts were so-called first generation peacekeeping. 
Relevant examples in this regard are the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Lebanon. The United Nations Operation in DR Congo (ONUC) was established in 
July 1960 to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in 
maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The Norwegian 
contribution lasted from 1960-1964, entailed 1173 soldiers from the Norwegian Army 
and Air Force, and was so far the most comprehensive UN operation since its 
establishment.
167
 The long-lasting efforts in Lebanon, called the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL I) was given the mandate to confirm Israeli 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon; restore international peace and security; and assist 
the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area.
168
 Lasting 
from 1978-1998,
169
 Norway was excessively involved, including the endowment of 
900 soldiers. 
From 1949-2010, more than 60 000 Norwegians have participated in UN peacekeeping 
missions.
170
 However, since the late 1990‟s, the international participation in 
peacekeeping operations has been dominated by extensive NATO-led operations, first 
in the Balkans, and later through the on-going operation in Afghanistan.
171
 During this 
period of time, there have only been a few Norwegian contributions to UN-operations: 
in February 2011, Norway was providing scarcely 64 soldiers, policemen and military 
observers to the UN,
172
 compared to 413 Norwegian troops currently stationed in 
                                                                
166 Minister of Defence, Strøm-Erichsen, A. Norges internasjonale engasjement for fred og sikkerhet, Speech at NTNU, 
01.12.2007. 
167 Angell, O. Jubileum for Kongoveteraner, The Norwegian Armed Forces URL. 
168 United Nations Peacekeeping missions, UNIFIL Mandate.  
169 United Nations Association of Norway, Norge og FNs fredsarbeid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Strøm-Erichsen, Speech 2007. 
172 United Nations, Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping operations, as of 28.02.2011.  
57 
 
Afghanistan,
173
 counting up to more than 7000 Norwegian troops which have been 
allocated in Afghanistan during the last decade.
174
 Although this comparison alludes a 
severe lack of Norwegian commitment to UN peacekeeping efforts on the ground, 
there are also examples deviating the trend. In 2006, Norway was invited to join the 
UN-led forces in Lebanon referred to by the acronym UNIFIL II, where the 
government deployed 130 troops including both operational military personnel and an 
enabling force.
175
 The UNIFIL II operation was mainly deployed to prevent weapons 
to reach Lebanon by sea, where Norway provided four military ships to control the 
coastline. In fact, this was the most extensive Norwegian military contribution to a UN 
operation,
176
 and was regarded as a commitment to the outspoken goal in the Soria 
Moria declaration to increase the Norwegian presence in the UN‟s ground forces.177  
The 2005 Soria Moria declaration was not only to support UN operations in general, 
but specifically operations on the African continent.
178
 During the 2000‟s there have 
been made five efforts to meet this goal: through the United Nations Mission in Sudan 
(referred to by its acronym UNMIS) and the African Union/United Nations Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), assisting the 
operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the enabling efforts to 
MINURCAT in Chad.
179
 In 2009, UNMIS constituted Norway‟s largest military 
presence in a UN peacekeeping operation, including 21 military officers
180
. The 
contribution to the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur,
181
 was supposed to 
provide a team of 400 Swedish and Norwegian engineers to assist in the early stage of 
the operation. Due to the Sudanese government‟s resentment in allowing non-African 
countries to participate in the operation, the Norwegian government concluded that it 
was not able to sustain the offer, and had to withdraw the troops that were ready to 
enter Darfur January 2008.
182
 Although the attempt to provide a task force in Darfur
183
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was considered a failure, Norway has managed to provide 8 civil police to UNMIS and 
5 civil police to UNAMID. 9 Norwegian civil police have also been deployed to 
UNMIL in Liberia, to assist in the UN support to security reform following the 
ceasefire.
184
 The efforts in DRC have mainly been to coordinate a security reform and 
assist with human rights observers. Last, but not least, are the 2009/2010 deployment 
of a water-drilling unit and a military hospital in Abéché, assisting and enabling the 
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. As previously 
mentioned, this was the first time in 17 years that Norway deployed Norwegian armed 
forces on African ground.  
In sum, the Norwegian contributions to UN operations in the African region on the 
ground are relatively small compared to the financial contributions to peacekeeping 
efforts. This is not to say that the money donated is not important contributions in 
achieving peace, but rather to underscore that it signals a lack of political will by 
placing the contributions through more reserved investments than on the ground 
forces.  The trend where Western states choose to contribute financially, thus leaving 
the „dirty work‟ to developing country, especially through the African Union (AU), 
has been accused as a way to disclaim responsibility for peace in African states. It 
must, however, be noted, that the rather newly established AU did indeed spring from 
a regional desire to be in charge of interventions on the African continent, and was 
initiated with the mandate to improve peace and security in the African region.
185
 As 
the AU have the mandate to intervene in state affairs, the role and responsibility of the 
UN in the African region has subsequently been reduced. The new concept of „African 
solutions to African problems‟ can thus be seen as a two-folded issue. On the one hand 
the role of the AU functions as a downplaying of the role of the UN – as it is argued 
that „regional solutions should take precedence over globally orchestrated action.‟186 In 
other words, there is a shift away from the idea that the West can solve internal 
problems on the African continent, to more regional approaches where African troops 
are the main resource. On the other hand, the support and encouragement to the AU 
has also been understood as an escape route for the UN to take responsibility in 
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humanitarian affairs in Africa. Whether or not this is the case, it is obvious that 
peacekeeping missions have become weaker, when the UN has left the responsibility 
to another supranational apparatus, which lacks the capacity and influence embodied 
in the UN framework.   
5.3 Chapter conclusion 
Aspirations to assert Norway as a nation of peace is indeed an ambitious task, and 
fulfilling the task requires both political will, military resources and popular support. 
As stated, the commitment to peace entails amongst other efforts, contributions to 
peacekeeping operations, which initially has to spring from a political desire to deploy 
Norwegian troops. If such political will is in place, it is up to the Norwegian Army 
Force (NAF) to consider whether they are able to commit to the task, and have the 
resources required for a successful mission. However, it is vital for the NAF and the 
Norwegian government to gain substantial popular support for the deployment of 
Norwegian troops. In order to summit such support, there must exist a distinct 
rationale for why Norway should contribute to a specific operation. As this chapter has 
illustrated, such a rationale may be founded upon a general commitment to peace, 
which again springs from an assumed peace tradition. According to the peace 
tradition, Norway is a country that is dedicated to support other countries in times of 
troubles, a notion that arguably has been accepted as part of the Norwegian „identity‟.  
The notion that Norway „wants and needs to work for peace‟187 does not only include a 
commitment to the allies in NATO, but also to the peacekeeping efforts in countries 
outside the North Atlantic region. As the more remote conflicts are not automatically 
connected to national security issues such as the more pressing concerns of an attack 
on a NATO member, it is oftentimes relatively more difficult to produce a general 
acceptance for investing financial and human resources into peacekeeping efforts. 
Consequently, instead of appealing to national security, the motivations and rationales 
for such commitments are often articulated within a value-oriented framework, 
including the concepts of humanitarianism and altruism. In this sense, the 
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peacekeeping efforts in remote areas are commonly understood as more altruistic 
efforts, which Norway contributes to because we can.  
Historically, the outspoken responsibility to „contribute where we can,‟188 has proved 
to be a motto that does not only illustrate the post-Cold War era, where Norway has 
strengthen its commitment to peace through various mediation and peacekeeping 
efforts, but a principle that actually dates back to the beginning of the 20
th
 century. The 
question is, however, whether the „new wars‟ and subsequent threats to state‟s security 
in any way has challenged values as a basis for engaging in peacekeeping operations? 
Are the challenges of the contemporary world affecting the priorities of Norwegian 
decision-makers? If one were to argue that the abovementioned Norwegian 
contributions to peacekeeping operations originally were founded on value-based 
rationales, are today‟s considerations of whether and how to contribute to 
peacekeeping efforts more affected by a strategic thinking? This is of course a rather 
comprehensive question and there may not be a straightforward way to respond to it. It 
may, however, function as a guiding puzzle for the following chapter of this thesis: 
what factors were decisive in the considerations prior to the engagement to, and the 
withdrawing from, MINURCAT?  
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CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS: VALUE-BASED INTEREST? 
 
This thesis‟ focus of attention has revolved around the trends of Norwegian foreign 
policy, where special emphasis has been placed on the commitment to peace and the 
efforts to brand Norway as a „humanitarian superpower‟. It has been argued that 
Norway has an outspoken vision to support the UN, especially through increased 
commitment on the ground. As the failed attempt to participate in UNAMID was 
considered a great disappointment to the Norwegian government, the decision to 
contribute in Chad through MINURCAT can be explained as a re-affirmation of the 
commitment to Sudan.
189
 The arguments put forward by Norwegian commentators 
points to the following ambiguity: if the desire to contribute to stabilize a war-torn 
region was of such great importance to the Norwegian government, it appears puzzling 
that they withdrew the troops before the mission was completed.
190
  
Preliminary to this part of the thesis‟ discussion, the first section of this chapter will 
provide an introduction to the line of events affecting the political decision-making 
processes of the MINURCAT contribution. Based on interviews with government 
officials at the MFA and the Ministry of Defence, as well as interviews with 
researchers and academics, this section‟s objective is to provide a detailed outline of 
the political processes. Further, the motivations for the entrance and the exit will be 
analysed by using the theoretical framework of interests and values.  
6.1 Empirical basis for the political considerations 
6.1.1 Starting points  
The decision to deploy Norwegian troops in Chad dates back to the long-planned 
decision of contributing to the war-torn region of Darfur in West-Sudan.
191
 As stated 
in Chapter 5, the original plan of deploying a 400-strong Norwegian force to 
UNAMID was halted by the Sudanese government‟s decision to deny the entrance of 
UN peacekeeping forces. As the Norwegian soldiers were trained and prepared for an 
international peacekeeping operation, the troops were made available for other UN 
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missions. In January 2008, two operations needed Norway‟s assistance: the 
MINURCAT operation in Chad, and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH). Although the capacities of the Norwegian military engineers were 
specifically requested to contribute to restore a secure and stable environment in Haiti, 
the Norwegian government chose to place its efforts in Chad.
192
 According to State 
Secretary at the MFA,
193
 Espen Barth Eide, it was later noted that it was not the 
capacity of the military engineers that was needed in MINURCAT after all, but in 
spite of this the Norwegian government decided to stand by its decision. This choice of 
action can be explained by Norway‟s general commitment to the Central African 
Region and Sudan, but more specifically it can be traced back to a previous request in 
2007 by European Union Force (EUFOR) to contribute to the operation in Chad. At 
that time, EUFOR was tasked with training police and improving judicial 
infrastructure, and Norway had declined the appeal to participate.
194
  
By March 2009, the UN force took over under the MINURCAT mandate and it was 
envisaged that it would become a 5000-strong UN peacekeeping force.
195
 Through the 
late 2008 discussions on whether the UN should replace the EU force with a UN 
peacekeeping force, the Norwegian government prepared for a new request to 
contribute, this time from the UN. When the transition was decided and the UN asked 
Norway to replace the operation of a field hospital previously managed by Italy, there 
was a already a strong political will to contribute to MINURCAT. According to a 
Senior Advisor at the MFA: „This willingness was based on the previous attempts to 
contribute to the situation in Darfur, and the Chad-operation was in line with the 
government‟s ambitions to support the UN and Africa.‟196 The readiness to contribute 
to MINURCAT was thus based on a general principle of supporting UN peacekeeping 
operations, and a specific desire to assist Sudanese refugees. Norway had no previous 
connections with Chad, but because of its geographic location neighbouring Sudan, the 
choice of supporting the operation was considered the „second best‟ solution.197 
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6.1.2 Military evaluations 
After welcoming the request from the UN, the next step in the decision-making 
process was to consider what sort of capacity the Norwegian military was capable of 
providing. This assessment was undertaken by the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF), 
which subsequently reported to the Ministry of Defence. Because of the previous 
preparations for the mission in Sudan, the NAF was already in possession of a certain 
region specific expertise, which was relatively transferable to the mission in Chad. The 
response from both the Ministry of Defence and the NAF was therefore that the 
contribution was both manageable and desirable.
198
 As there was already substantial 
and coherent political will to contribute to this operation, the positive NAF analysis 
was satisfactory to all parties. The only difficulty was that the UN had requested the 
hospital to be operative within two months, and considering that the NAF usually 
requires one year of preparation, they were pressured on time.
199
 Despite the time 
constraints, the Norwegian contribution was in place June 2009,
200
 consisting of the 
financing and running of a water-well drilling unit and a field hospital for serving the 
UN personnel, managed in cooperation with Serbia.
201
  
The numbers provided by the 2009 budget of the Ministry of Finance states that the 
operation was initially supposed to cost 300 million NOK.
202
 However, according to 
Norwegian newspapers and research articles, the total cost of the operation exceeded 
500 million NOK.
203
 Additionally, although the request from the UN called for only 
60 troops, the Norwegian contribution totalled 152 personnel.
204
 A Senior Advisor at 
the Ministry of Defence offers the following explanations for the gap in numbers: 
Firstly, the high costs of the contribution can be explained by the differences between 
the assessments made by the UN compared to that of the NAF.
205
 The Norwegian 
contribution included a large, modern level II hospital, which was in line with 
Norwegian standards. The Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence argues that the 
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hospital in Chad could not be of any less quality than what was provided to 
Afghanistan. Deputy Military Advisor at the Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN, 
Bengt Holmen, explains that the reason for this is based on the military directive that 
the NAF shall only deploy units that are compatible with NATO-standards.
206
 
Secondly, the evaluations undertaken by the NAF were based on the predictions of a 
complete UN force of 5500 soldiers, when in fact only half were deployed. However, 
this was also what the UN had accounted for when they requested a deployment of 60 
personnel to the enabling force. Thirdly, the deployment had to be in line with the 
guidelines provided by Norwegian health advice, which demands certain standards for 
Norwegian soldiers that could not be negotiated. NAF could not offer a mid-range 
solution satisfactory to these standards. Finally, there is little room for the Ministry of 
Defence to comment, nor modify, the recommendations made by NAF, as they are in 
possession of the military expertise,
207
 and their judgment has to be trusted.  
When Norway replied that they were willing to contribute to the operation, it was 
stressed to the UN that the NAF only had committed to manage the hospital for one 
year.
208
 According to Karlsrud, the UN had accepted Norway‟s offer with the 
possibilities of extending it for a longer period.
209
 Holmen refutes this claim, stating 
that the reason for the one-year time limit was that the Norwegian contribution was 
only to enable the EUFOR-countries to re-hat to MINURCAT and that the UN was 
aware of this premise.
210
 The only thing DPKO had required was precise dates for 
when Norway would depart.
211
 Military contributions to international operations 
require extensive preparations, and the civil personnel from the health services 
stationed in Abéché had restricted contracts regarding how long they could be retained 
in the field. Late 2009, when the UN requested Norway to continue the running of the 
hospital, there apparently was not another set of civil personnel disposable to the NAF. 
Hence, the scarcity in human resources was given as the main reason for why Norway 
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chose to limit the contribution to only one year.
212
  
6.1.3 Requests to prolong the contribution and deciding to leave 
As the previous section illustrated, the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT was 
intended to only last for one year, from March 2009, to May 2010. This time period 
was based on NAF evaluations, stating that the NAF department of sanitation, which 
controlled the deployment of civil hospital personnel, was not capable of sustaining 
the offer beyond one year.
213
 A Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence argues that 
the time limits of the contribution had been stated very clear to the UN, thus late 
August 2009 Russia offered to take over the running of the hospital after Norway‟s 
departure. However, in December 2009, Russia announced that they were no longer 
able to contribute to the mission, and Norway was again asked to re-evaluate their 
decision to depart Abéché in May 2010. The NAF was consulted and replied that the 
Norwegian MINURCAT personnel were unable to extend their mission and instead 
had to be deployed in other contexts, or were obligated to return to Norway.
214
 If they 
were to consider this request, the NAF needed more time to re-adjust, but the request 
came too late for the UN to arrange for another country to replace Norway in the 
meantime. According to a Senior Advisor at the MFA, the main reason for not 
continuing the running of the hospital beyond May 2010 was due to logistical 
challenges and time constraints. Another interviewee claimed that there was 
substantial political will to continue the contribution, and great disappointment when it 
was concluded that it was not manageable.
215
 The decline was reported back to the UN 
in December 2009.  
According to interviewees; the NAF, Norwegian politicians, the UN and international 
organisations such as the Red Cross, all considered the operation a success.
216
 
Labelling the operation as a success was especially due to the Dakar Peace agreement 
between Sudan and Chad, where the respective presidents in the two countries agreed 
to end their differences, normalize relations between the countries and to take the 
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necessary measures to help achieve peace and stability in the region.
217
 In spite of this, 
however, the Chadian government was not particularly satisfied with the UN presence. 
According to Professor of Development Studies at Oslo University Collage and author 
of the 2011 MFA report on Chad, Dr Ketil Fred Hansen; the main objectives for 
inviting the UN were primarily to stop Sudanese refugees from entering Chad and to 
have the UN assist in developing infrastructure.
218
 MINURCAT was not mandated to 
hinder the flow of refugees from Darfur, whereby this would seem to explain why 
President Déby wrote a letter to the UN Secretary-General, January 15, requesting 
MINURCAT to withdraw its troops and pledged full responsibility for protecting 
civilians on its territory.
219
  
A Senior Advisor at the MFA holds that the UN was eager to continue its mission, but 
that this was out of the question without President Déby‟s support. At this point, it was 
already decided that Norway would not prolong its contribution, and the decision to 
leave Chad in May was still standing. Because President Déby had specified that he 
wanted the field hospital and the water-drilling unit to remain in Chad after 
MINURCAT withdrew, there was a third round of internal discussions within the 
MFA, this time whether Norway was capable of continuing its contribution until the 
end of 2010, when the MINURCAT mandate expired. According to a Senior Advisor 
at the Ministry of Defence, new considerations were now taking place: whether or not 
the contribution could be prolonged for only a couple of months. One of the decisive 
factors in this matter was that the rainy season in Chad began in July, which would 
make the return of the hospital especially difficult.
220
 The belief that the efforts 
required to extend Norway‟s contribution were not worth the rewards of continuing, 
did in the end won out, and the final conclusion was that Norway would stick by its 
decision to end its contribution in May. In sum, it appears as though the Norwegian 
government was willing but not able to continue the efforts in Chad.    
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6.2 Understanding the Mission in Chad: applying the framework of 
interests and values 
6.2.1 How values and interests affected the considerations prior to the 
Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT  
Limited commitment 
The Norwegian commitment to peace has traditionally been characterized by value-
based considerations. When assessing how values triggered the decision to engage in 
Chad, it is useful to return to Max Weber‟s concept of ethics: actions guided by „ethics 
of conviction‟ and „ethics of responsibilities‟. Separating the two ethics is of course a 
rather narrow way of understanding the two terms, as both the intention to do good and 
the will to achieve good results should be present in what Weber refers to as „sound 
politics.‟221 However, in order to consider the degree of success for both maxims, one 
must be able to understand where the initial starting points were. When considering the 
success-level of an action guided by ethics of conviction, one must clarify the actor‟s 
intentions. To establish the level of success of an action guided by ethics of 
responsibilities, one must clarify the final results the actor is trying to achieve.  
When analysing the intentions and the results of the Norwegian contribution, it must 
be emphasised that this was indeed a significant change from a long period with no 
support to the UN forces on the ground in Africa. The decision to contribute in Chad 
certainly satisfied the promises made in the Soria Moria declarations. At this point, it 
must be stressed that Norway did not participate directly to peacekeeping in Chad, but 
was rather part of an enabling force to „help the helpers.‟222 The goal was to empower 
the UN troops to be more effective in their efforts to secure the lives of refugees and 
IDP‟s. According to NUPI Research Fellow and also former Special Assistant to the 
SRSG to MINURCAT, John Karlsrud; USG Malcorra, head of UN Department of 
Field Support declared that a field hospital should be committed for three years, in 
order to enhance stability and predictability for the peacekeeping troops.
223
 Arguably, 
a long-term presence is highly important to secure peace – especially in such a war-
torn region as Central-Africa. This statement was made after the withdrawal of the 
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Norwegian contribution, but without referring to Norway‟s decision as such.224  
A Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence refuted this argument, claiming that this 
is not part of the considerations prior to engagement in international military 
operations.
225
 As the NAF only had capacity to run the hospital for one year, it was 
agreed that it was better to stay for a limited time period rather than not contributing at 
all.
226
 This statement reflects an intention guided by an ethics of conviction: a will to 
do good without necessarily achieving more ambitious objectives. The statement holds 
that it is better for Norway to contribute to MINURCAT, but better for whom? It is 
implied that it is better for the operation as a whole to have Norway providing an 
enabling force for a limited time period, but it can also be argued that it was indeed 
better for Norway‟s self-image to show its commitment for a short time period, rather 
than not contributing at all.  
The motivation for contributing to MINURCAT can thus be analyzed on two levels. 
On one level, the intention of the Norwegian contribution was to provide a hospital for 
UN troops, and the mission was in that sense successful if the running of the hospital 
was successful. The field hospital was modern, equipped and deployed by a large 
number of skilled personnel, and was in that regard considered a vital contributing 
element to MINURCAT. On another level, the Norwegian contribution was motivated 
by a more extended ambition to contribute to peace and stability in the Central African 
region. As argued by Karlsrud, such results are more difficult to accomplish during a 
limited time frame of one year. One can therefore argue that while the intention of 
contributing to peacekeeping in Africa was met, it is more difficult to determine to 
what extent peace and stability was actually accomplished by the Norwegian 
contribution to MINURCAT.  
In sum, it appears that a general framework of values inspired the Norwegian 
government to participate in Chad, but that the motivations can be better explained by 
Weber‟s ethic of convictions, than ethics of responsibility. The conviction was thus the 
point of departure for initiating the contribution, but unintended consequences such as 
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military constraints hampered the full implementation of the policy. When guided by 
responsibilities the actor must apply a more steadfast strategy and follow through the 
commitment so that he achieves the desired results. The objective of MINURCAT was 
to achieve stability in Chad, equalling the desired result. Achieving stability and 
securing the lives of refugees and IDP‟s is in itself a good intention, but such a 
commitment requires solid political will to stay the time it takes to get actual results. In 
the case of Norway, the external factor of the military constraints hindered the 
government in trying to sustain its efforts for the period requested by the UN. One can 
therefore argue that in theory, the Norwegian contribution was guided by ethics of 
responsibility, but when trying to implement the ambitions it appeared more as an 
action guided by convictions. Limiting the contribution to only one year demonstrated 
that the government was more willing to „do good‟ than to accomplish the more 
ambitious results that could have been possible by planning to stay for a longer period.  
Why Africa? 
The latter section illustrated that the MINURCAT contribution fulfilled a political goal 
of supporting the UN in Africa.
227
 This general objective has been stated several times 
by government officials as well as in official documents. Because it is emphasised as 
one of the general motivational factors, the origin of this commitment deserves a 
closer investigation. According to State Secretary in the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Espen Barth Eide, the Soria Moria objective is based on a „desire to reintroduce a 
commitment to the UN and restore the balance between the contributions to the UN 
compared to NATO operations after 2001.‟228 After a period of a strong commitment 
to its allies in NATO and a focus on fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, it was time to 
re-affirm Norway‟s commitment to the international organization. The contribution to 
MINURCAT did thus fulfil the aspirations set by the government, leading to political 
„success‟ by deviating from the trend of 17 years without Norwegian peacekeeping 
troops in Africa.  
This way of framing the intentions as fulfilling a general political goal does indeed 
question the Norwegian commitment to the particular operation in Chad. The 
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impression that the contribution to Chad was based on a quite imprecise objective is 
also identified in the Ministry of Defence‟s press release announcing the Norwegian 
contribution to MINURCAT: 
Norway's view is that Western countries largely have left the countries in 
the developing world to provide forces to the UN's most challenging 
operations, which largely takes place in Africa. After our long-planned 
contributions to the UN operation in Darfur was hampered by opposition 
from Sudan's president last winter, it is particularly gratifying that we 
can contribute in neighbouring Chad, where the UN recently requested a 
high quality field hospital.
229
 
The statement highlights a renewed commitment to peacekeeping in Africa in general, 
but does not explain why Norway chose to contribute to Chad in particular. In order to 
understand the decision of engaging in Chad, one must look at the surrounding 
circumstances, namely the element neighbouring Sudan.   
Transferability: the element of interests 
As there already was a trained competence within the NAF to contribute to Sudan, the 
military skills could relatively easily be transferred to the mission in neighbouring 
Chad. This argument of transferability has been consistent throughout this thesis but it 
has not been explained why the Norwegian government wanted to contribute in Sudan 
in the first place. Because the element of Sudan appears to have explanatory power for 
the motivation to engage in Chad, the analysis would benefit from a more inclusive 
examination of motivational factors for engaging in Sudan. First of all, one key 
argument to understanding the Norwegian commitment to the on-going conflict in 
Sudan is articulated by former Minister of Defence, Strøm-Erichsen: „The great 
conflicts in Africa, first and foremost in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in 
Sudan/Chad have taken more lives than any other conflicts in our time.‟230  
The statement reflects what previously has been described as the „need‟-factor: When 
deciding to contribute to peacekeeping operations, Norway considers the relative 
necessity of contributing. As stated by the former Minster of Defence, the 
humanitarian situation in the Central African region is too acute not to invest in 
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peacekeeping efforts. Norway‟s commitment to peace in Sudan has been a long-lasting 
process, especially concerning the preparations for the 2005 peace agreement between 
the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement and the Government of Sudan. Additionally, 
Norwegian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have since the early 1970‟s 
contributed to the humanitarian efforts in the Darfur-region.
231
 Apart from 
peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts, the MFA also recognizes that security 
concerns have been an additional driving force behind the commitment to Sudan. The 
abiding conflicts of the 1990‟s caused great instability in the region, which threatened 
Norwegian political and economic interests, especially the Norwegian/Sudanese oil 
cooperation.
232
 In all, Norway‟s commitment to Sudan turns out to be characterized by 
genuine dedication to the humanitarian situation, with elements of self-interests. 
Based on the long-term commitment to Sudan, it appears that the motivations for 
engaging in Chad are partly based on the aforementioned concept of selectivity: 
Norway chose to contribute in a region where there already were oil-related interests. 
Even though economic interests didn‟t directly affect the relationship between Norway 
and Chad, instability in the region affects – and is affected by – the conflict in Sudan. 
Consequently, by contributing to stabilize Chad, MINURCAT‟s peacekeeping efforts 
had a positive effect on the situation in Sudan. The outspoken motivation of engaging 
in Chad because it was regarded as a „next door‟ solution to the desire to participate in 
Sudan might represent the strategic interests of the Norwegian government to secure 
its national political and economic interests.  
In sum, the commitment to the region can also be explained by a certain dualism, 
where both values and interests affected the considerations. Values, as such, was thus 
the underlying factors for why Norway chose to contribute to peacekeeping efforts in 
general, whereas national interests might explain the choice of placing its efforts in the 
specific context of peacekeeping in the oil-rich country of Sudan. In the same way as 
NAF‟s military expertise on the conflict in Sudan was considered transferable to the 
mission in Chad, this section has illustrated that the intentions of engaging in Sudan 
might be transferable to the intention of engaging in Chad as well.  
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Making use of ‘soft’ powers 
Being a small, peaceful country, Norway has the ability to act as a trustworthy partner, 
without its own political agenda.  When considering how the importance of allies 
affected the decision making process, it is again valuable to refer to the outspoken 
ambition in the Soria Moria platform of supporting the UN in Africa. As a committed 
member of the UN, Norway is able to access powerful actors that might contribute to 
enhancing Norway‟s interests.233 The international organization is also an arena where 
Norway can promote its „soft power.‟ This term includes the ability to „shape the 
preferences of others‟234 without the use of military power. Norway‟s financial 
contribution to the UN has certainly affirmed its commitment to the organization, but 
the lack of commitment on the ground has been symptomatic of the lack of political 
will to peacekeeping in Africa – a trend that presumably undermines its self-image as a 
nation dedicated to peace.  
Being a country struggling to live up to an image as a „humanitarian superpower‟, one 
would assume that the contribution to MINURCAT was a strategic choice of action to 
change a unfavourable perception of a member only providing financial assistance. By 
making a positive exception by contributing on the ground, Norway wanted to deviate 
from the trend of inaction by Western states. To this, it must be noted that the 
MINURCAT operation consisting of EU forces naturally involved other European 
states, such as Ireland, Poland and Finland, and the Norwegian contribution was 
therefore not particularly remarkable. However, as stated by State Secretary Eide, 
Norway was the first country to step in to offer a contribution to MINURCAT after 
EUFOR‟s departure, something that was highly appreciated by the UN,235 especially 
as it directly contributed to other European powers prolonging their deployments.
236
 
Moreover, Eide argues that even though largely populated countries like India and 
Bangladesh are still taking on the majority of the responsibility by providing „boots on 
the ground‟, it is especially important that Western countries assist with their niche 
capacities.
237
 Particularly because there has been a clear void of Western states on the 
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ground in Africa, Norway‟s contribution was certainly noticed by the „new powers.‟238 
Contributing with a field hospital is a rather advanced form of assistance and by 
placing a an expensive niche capacity in Chad, Norway signalled that it was making a 
clear effort to help in the Central African region.  
In sum, the contribution led to an improvement in Norway‟s image as a committed 
peacekeeper, and thereby strengthening its overall reputation within the UN.
239
 As the 
Soria Moria platform appears to be a rather substantial part of the motivational 
framework for the contribution, one can argue that the importance of allies, and in this 
context, the UN; was a considerable motivational factor. Showing support and 
commitment to „allies‟ in the UN doesn‟t necessarily involve the aspiration of 
reciprocity, but can rather be explained by a desire to be identified as a country that 
wants to be a credible actor on the international scene – perhaps even starring as a 
„humanitarian superpower‟.  
Necessity and success – reintroducing NAF to Africa 
One final point remains to be discussed; the necessity of contributing versus the ability 
to generate success. As emphasized by Foreign Minster Støre, considerations 
regarding where to place Norway‟s efforts depend on the following factors: 
considering where Norway should contribute, also referred to as the necessity factor, 
contra where Norway can make a difference, in this regard referred to as the success 
rate. Essentially, the main objective is to invest in operations that are manageable and 
relevant to Norway; where Norway can „make a difference.‟240 Accordingly, the 
Norwegian contribution, consisting of the running of a field hospital and a water-
drilling unit, was relatively manageable and didn‟t involve the risk of Norwegian 
forces participating in a sensitive and dangerous mission. As the MINURCAT 
mandate was limited to the protection of IDP‟s, unaccompanied by the challenging 
aspect of state building and actively participating in armed conflict, the operation 
could to a large degree be considered as „safe‟. The Norwegian contribution to the 
NATO-led operation in Afghanistan was already stretching the NAF,
241
 making them 
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unable to exert military resources in other more demanding peacekeeping missions. 
Conclusively, the mission in Chad met the requirements of the Norwegian 
prioritization principle of generating a relatively high level of success without risking 
being involved in a long-lasting, costly military operation.  
Based on the previous sections, there are factors that stand out as decisive in the 
decision-making process of contributing to MINURCAT. It can be argued that the 
political considerations were partly guided by values, being the will to assist UN 
peacekeeping efforts in Chad. It has been argued that the Norwegian government 
wanted to re-affirm its loyalty and commitment to the UN, after a long period of being 
oriented towards the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. However, as the will to place 
efforts in a UN operation in Africa certainly was an outspoken ambition, the choice of 
placing efforts in Chad appears more arbitrarily. It was argued that the Norwegian 
troops initially trained for deployment in Sudan were transferable to Chad. This factor 
looses its explanatory value considering State Secretary Eide argument: during the 
considerations of where to deploy the troops, it became clear that it was not the 
prepared capacity of military engineers that was needed in MINURCAT after all.
242
 
Rather, it was requested from the UN that Norway contributed with the military 
engineers to the rebuilding of Haiti. Even so, the Norwegian government decided to 
keep its commitment to the Central African region and sent a different contingent to 
MINURCAT than the troops that had prepared for Sudan. This led to a closer 
investigation of why this specific region was so particularly important for the 
Norwegian government.  
Conclusively, the findings showed that two elements were in place at the MINURCAT 
operation: it was both manageable for the NAF to run the field hospital – which 
offered a relatively high likelihood of success, and the Norwegian contribution was 
needed; both by the UN and for the NAF to build capacities for future deployments in 
Africa. The arbitrary nature of the support for Chad and the shortness of the 
commitment, together with the cost/-benefit analysis suggest that the Norwegian 
                                                                
242 Eide, interview 16.05.2011. 
75 
 
government was looking for political gain in the UN rather than fulfilling a specific 
commitment to Chad.  
6.2.2 Investigating how values and interests affected the considerations to end 
the contribution to MINURCAT 
Something extraordinary 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the motivational factors that influenced the 
decision to end the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT, it must be stated that the 
premise for the Norwegian contribution was that it was only to last for one year – and 
in that sense; the withdrawal of the troops did not break any promises. The NAF 
provided a high quality field hospital and deployed a large number of health personnel, 
which in part enabled the UN forces to carry out their tasks. Nevertheless, the 
Norwegian contribution withdrew its troops even though the UNSG urged the 
Norwegian government to stay in Chad.
243
 When Norway declined the request to 
prolong the running of the hospital, the UN was left without adequate medical support, 
causing other countries to signal that they would withdraw and both Ireland and 
Finland pulled out
244
 when they realised that the Norwegian hospital would not be 
extended.
245
 If the contribution to MINURCAT was motivated by an objective to 
increase support to the UN, it seems contrary to the Soria Moria declaration to decline 
the request for prolonging the running of the hospital. In the end, and unrelated to the 
Norwegian withdrawal, it was the Chadian government that called in for the 
withdrawal of MINURCAT and „committed itself to take full responsibility for the 
security of the civilian population in eastern part of the country.‟246 This, however, 
does not remove the very fact that Norway‟s decision to discontinue the running of the 
hospital and likely would have had negative consequences for the success of the 
operation, and caused a significant weakening in Norway‟s political prestige within the 
UN.
247
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Senior Advisors interviewed, as well as statements from official documents, all hold 
that Norway‟s discontinuation of the hospital can be ascribed to the lack of personnel. 
This rather straightforward explanation makes the efforts of examining the motivations 
for withdrawing seems rather purposeless taken at face value. However, one argument 
inspired further study: a Senior Advisor at the MFA stated that „if Norway were to 
prolong the contribution, something extraordinary would have had to take place. It 
would certainly have been for the better if we had managed to stay for a longer 
period.‟248 It is this rather ambiguous element; a lack of „something extraordinary‟, 
which deserves closer investigation: given that factors such as apparent political will 
and international pressure to continue the contribution were present, one may ask why 
this was not sufficient enough to sustain the operation? In other words: can the 
framework of interests and values contribute to a more suitable understanding of why 
the Norwegian government ended the contribution?  
Afghanistan versus Africa 
When investigating states‟ motivations for contributing to peacekeeping efforts, it is 
useful to review the current international security situation. Contemporary threats to 
international security are broad and complex, characterised by a high level of 
uncertainty and unpredictability. According to Lunde and Thune, international security 
policy is currently largely concerned with the war in Afghanistan, where the enemy 
constitutes a non-state actor that lacks respect for international laws of war.
249
 Foreign 
and defence politics have therefore created new ways and new rhetoric to handle the 
challenges connected to terrorism, insurgencies and internal crises in other countries. 
State Secretary at the MFA, Eide, explains this transition by the following:  
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When we deployed Norwegian troops in the Balkans, people were 
questioning why we engaged in a conflict relatively unrelated to 
Norway‟s national security. When we deployed troops in Afghanistan, 
the same questions were asked, but then the efforts in the Balkans 
appeared more obvious. When we deployed peacekeeping troops in Chad 
in 2009, the reasons for our involvement in Afghanistan seemed more 
apparent than the rationales to place efforts in such a remote conflict as 
the Central African region.
250
 
Eide‟s statement illustrates not only how difficult it is to justify peacekeeping efforts 
on reasons that are not directly affecting national security, but also how the 
perceptions of threats and national security are constantly changing. As of 2011, most 
of the NAF efforts are dedicated to the war in Afghanistan, where more than 7000 
Norwegian troops have been deployed since 2001.
251
 As argued by the Ministry of 
Defence, the extensive efforts in Afghanistan have both stretched the NAF‟s 
capacities, and led to a rather narrowed focus on this one particular area of conflict. It 
has been determined that the Norwegian forces will depart ISAF in 2014, and 
politicians, military experts and commentators are questioning what the Norwegian 
military should do post Afghanistan.
252
 One could argue that a national military force 
benefits from a military operation because it enables them to maintain a certain level 
of competence. Thus, the NAF must start preparing for alternative missions when they 
return from Afghanistan.
253
 State Secretary Eide suggests that Norway should use its 
military efforts in wider contexts – such as peacekeeping in Africa, both to show 
commitment to the acute conflicts that are constantly unfolding and the efforts of the 
UN; an organization that has received relatively less attention after Norway‟s 
involvement in Afghanistan.  
The Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan has thus provided two explanations to the 
efforts in Chad. The decision to contribute to MINURCAT may be explained by a 
desire to build military capacities in regions other than the Middle East. Contributing 
with a field hospital in Chad is thus a rather „soft‟ way of introducing Norwegian 
soldiers to peacekeeping in Africa. The decision to discontinue the contribution has a 
two-folded explanation: After one year of deployment, the NAF had acquired their 
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desired experience and was ready to leave MINURCAT with the lessons learned from 
this UN operation. As stated by the State Secretary Eide: „the mission in Chad has 
restored our UN-competence,‟254 and the military purpose of placing troops in Africa 
was thus met. Additionally, lack of resources available for a possible continuation was 
arguably because the NAF was too strained by the efforts in Afghanistan. To this, a 
Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence states that „if we had seen a relegation in 
Afghanistan, the total strain on the NAF would have been reduced, and the situation 
would have been different.‟255  
In sum, the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan played an important role both to 
the considerations of engaging in Chad, and also to the considerations of withdrawing. 
Basically, the long-lasting commitment to ISAF has narrowed NAF‟s capacities to 
handle other types of conflict and is also restraining the military from investing 
resources in other conflicts. Norway‟s ambition to change this routine did perhaps 
serve the purpose of broadening the NAF abilities, but this intention did arguably not 
serve the best interests of MINURCAT.  
A costly contribution – a show-off?  
This analysis has suggested that the commitment to MINURCAT appeared to be 
guided by the rationale of „good intentions‟, to a greater extent than achieving „good 
results‟. Commentators have argued that it was quite irresponsible to leave the 
operation without a solution to how the field hospital would be managed.
256
 This 
realisation was to some extent affirmed by a Senior Advisor, stating that there 
certainly were some „lessons learned‟ regarding the MINURCAT contribution:  
The NAF should have tried to strip down the contribution. If we were to 
stay in an operation with such an extensive segment like the field 
hospital again, it would definitely be better to stay for longer. Norway 
does not want to repeat that mistake of departing prematurely.
257
   
This statement reflects the two main critiques that have been posed by Norwegian 
commentators: the operation was too expensive and the troops left too early.
258
 The US 
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Ambassador to Norway, Barry White, recognizes the same sentiment. In a classified 
document published by Wikileaks, Ambassador White reports that it was the high 
costs of the Norwegian hospital that made Russia unexpectedly withhold its planned 
contribution to Chad.
259
 Moreover, it is reported by a US diplomat that the Minister of 
Defence, Grete Faremo, received complaints from MINURCAT administration when 
she visited Chad: an officer at MINURCAT claimed that the hospital was „so fancy‟ 
that Russia refused to offer anything of any less quality.
260
 If so, this was indeed an 
unexpected and negative consequence of the Norwegian contribution.  
The MINURCAT contribution was indeed an expensive affair; it has even been argued 
that it was the most expensive airlift operation in the history of NAF.
261
 This thesis 
recognises that there are various explanations for the costly contribution, ranging from 
commentators arguing that the NAF wanted to test out new equipment,
262
 to official 
statements claiming that Norway had to uphold a necessary standard.
263
 Because the 
reasons for withdrawing partly have been explained by budgetary constraints,
264
 it is 
productive to look at a political motivation for why it was so expensive. The 
Norwegian foreign policy scholar and commentator Asle Toje offers an explanation of 
this abundance. According to Toje, the main goals of foreign policy are the following: 
security, autonomy, economy and prestige. Toje holds that security has been used as 
the independent variable in the sense that it has determined whom to trade with, who 
to interact with, and where to „show off.‟265 It is this latter element that is highly 
relevant to the case of MINURCAT: the Norwegian hospital indeed was of a higher 
quality, and deployed with approximately twice as many health personnel than what 
the UN had requested. In line with the answers provided by a Senior Advisor at the 
Ministry of Defence, State Secretary Eide affirms that „the average UN standard is not 
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the average Norwegian standard. We use an enormous amount of money when we do 
something - hell of a lot of money - and we do it well.‟266  
In sum, Norway chose to provide an expensive hospital to an international operation – 
thus representing an image of Norway as a country that makes an extra effort. 
Promoting an image as a generous UN member might have been motivational for 
engaging in Chad, but the expensive hospital did in the end backfire. If another 
country would have been willing to take over the running of the hospital, Norway‟s 
departure would not have appeared so irresponsible, and the image as a country 
committed to peace, would perhaps have been maintained.  
Committed to peace or security? 
Based on the Norwegian commitment to peace, it is argued that contributing to a 
peacekeeping operation in Africa is important in itself. The Norwegian engagement 
policy can thus be described as a platform for how Norway wants to behave. The 
problems arise when the idealistic aspirations materialize into real life politics: it will 
often occur a clash between being and doing. If Norway had an unlimited commitment 
to restore peace in Chad and securing the lives of IDP‟s, the Norwegian troops would 
not have departed MINURCAT. In real world situations, the commitment to peace is 
thus regulated by other factors, such as budgetary and military constraints. As stated 
by a Senior Advisor at the MFA, political will in itself cannot enable an endless stream 
of funds and resources.
267
 Even a wealthy country like Norway must prioritize its 
spending, and as the NAF already was involved in the ISAF-operation in Afghanistan, 
they were clearly stretched. Unnecessary to state, Afghanistan is substantially different 
from Chad; terror in the region poses as a more distinct threat to Norway‟s security, 
and contributing to ISAF is considered a better way of communicating support and 
commitment to Norway‟s closest allies. This factor is emphasised in the 2009 
Government proposition Interests, opportunities and responsibilities,
268
 stating that 
„expectations that our allies will engage for the benefit of Norwegian interests, if we 
ever need it, is closely related to our willingness to participate in the NATO-led 
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operations.‟269 In the dilemma between idealism and reality, state security and 
alliances with military powers appears to precede humanitarian concerns.  
When discussing the interplay between being and doing, in this regard translated to 
values and interests, Professor Matlary‟s study of political considerations is of use. 
The study showed that Norwegian decision-makers seldom reflect on how a value-
based agenda can translate into interest-based results. Perhaps the withdrawal from 
MINURCAT can be explained by an inability to envision how a value-based agenda 
could translate into more benefiting results? The previous sections have illustrated that 
an idealistic agenda of contributing to Africa was interspersed with interest-based 
factors such as re-affirming commitment to the UN, securing stability in the Central 
African region, and training the NAF for future UN-operations. But as the NAF 
capabilities were pressured, the more strategic operation in Afghanistan was 
considered more important. Perhaps the reason for the discontinuation can be 
explained by Norwegian policy-makers incapability to recognizing peacekeeping in 
Africa as important? According to Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, the Norwegian 
engagement policy is based on a „naïve idealism, which overlooks essential Norwegian 
interests.‟270 If the operation in Chad had been characterized by more interest-based 
traits, the political scenario would perhaps have played out differently. NUPI 
researchers Benjamin de Carvalho,  Randi Solhjell  and Jon Harald Sande Lie, claim 
that the conflict in Chad is of interest to Norway. The problem is rather how the 
Norwegian government perceives the situation:  
It is important that Norway is involved in conflicts other than Afghanistan; 
to gain international experience from several conflicts and thus be better 
equipped to face new challenges in the future. Chad is not Afghanistan. 
Chad is more important than Afghanistan. In Chad, Norwegian forces 
make a difference.
271
 
In sum, basing a contribution to a peacekeeping operation on values and necessity is 
apparently not enough to sustain a long-term commitment. When pressured, the 
Norwegian government chose to concentrate on the mission in Afghanistan. As the 
previous section illustrated, this can be explained by either a lack of strategic interests 
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in Africa, or an inability to recognize how peacekeeping in Africa can be in Norway‟s 
self-interest.  
6.2.3 From entering to exiting: what caused the political motivations to 
change?  
This thesis has persistently referred to Norway‟s role as a nation of peace, with both 
broad international legitimacy related to not being a former colonial power, as well as 
an international engagement connected to altruism and solidarity.
272
 Affirming its role 
as an ally of Western states and a loyal member of the UN, Norway has participated in 
a number of peacekeeping operations, both NATO –and UN-led missions. Chapter 5 
demonstrated how Norway has engaged in conflicts where they had little or no 
strategic interests. Furthermore, the contribution to MINURCAT was a continuation of 
an overall objective to support UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, and to restore 
the support of Western states in this fairly neglected region. Norway made an example 
as a devoted member of the UN, dedicated to peacekeeping efforts in regions relatively 
unrelated to the war on terror. By doing so, Norway introduced values such as 
„solidarity‟ and „humanitarianism‟ to a dialogue that increasingly has been 
characterized by „preventing threats to national security‟ and „a battle of opposing 
ideals and values‟.  
 
Joining a UN operation emphasised that Western states could be able to do two things: 
safeguarding national interests in supporting ISAF forces and promoting altruistic 
values by contributing to peace and stability in remote conflicts. This might have been 
the ambition when Norway chose to place troops in Chad, but this thinking cannot 
have been present when they chose to discontinue the contribution. During the period 
of deployment, the willingness and ability to grant the necessary means for an 
extended presence diminished. Researchers and commentators have offered various 
explanations for the changes that occurred during this time-period, one being the US 
decline of a joint continuation of the running of the hospital.
273
 During August and 
September 2009, State Secretary Eide initiated several discussions with the US to join 
                                                                
272 Tørres, L. Globalisering og utfordringer for norsk engasjementspolitikk. 2000. 
273 Hansen, interview 4.11.2010 
83 
 
the running of the hospital.
274
 However, Eide does not confirm that the US decline was 
a contributing factor to Norway‟s decision: „although it would have been rewarding to 
cooperate with the US in Chad, their decline does not explain the Norwegian 
withdrawal.‟275  
 
Another interpretation of the assumed change in the political considerations is the 
claim that the government was opting for political support prior to the 2009 election by 
meeting one of the Soria Moria ambitions. This was also rejected by political advisors 
at the Ministry of Defence and the MFA, arguing that there is little popular support to 
gain by deploying peacekeeping efforts in Africa.  Rather, it is easier to increase 
popularity by placing military efforts in regions that are neither declared as Norway‟s 
main partners nor the countries that need Norway‟s support the most. This might be 
explained by a more general trend on the international arena following the War on 
Terror: Globalisation and great-power politics are increasingly affecting Norwegian‟s 
perception of external threats, and consequently shaping the political agenda. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the value-based willingness of the Norwegian 
government to engage in Chad was eventually affected by the more general strategic 
interests of the „international community‟ thus changing the political motivations, 
helping explain the brief mission in Chad. One explanatory factor for why Norway 
chose to contribute to MINURCAT was to prepare the NAF for UN-led operations 
post-Afghanistan. It has been argued that the focus of Western states‟ will move from 
state building in Afghanistan to peacekeeping in Africa. However, this is not a shift 
that can take place before the ISAF troops have withdrawn from Afghanistan. In the 
meantime it likely that commitments to conflict solving in African countries will be 
characterized by more short-term deployment, like the Norwegian MINURCAT 
contribution.   
 
Although the claim that the contribution to MINURCAT was a political strategy to 
gain popular support was refuted, the 2009 election was indeed important for the 
political will to continue efforts in Chad. Firstly, Grethe Faremo was appointed as the 
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new Minister of Defence, and she did naturally not have same relation to the decision-
making processes regarding MINURCAT. Secondly, Sigbjørn Johnson was appointed 
Minister of Finance, and due to the 2008 financial crisis he was forced to pursue a 
much stricter policy regarding Norway‟s extensive investments in the hospital.276 The 
scenario had changed: the new political leadership did not have the same portfolios 
and engagement as the previous ministers and the financial situation had limited the 
political capacities. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION  
 
The purpose of this study has been to address the basic motives and rationales for the 
Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT and assess how much relative influence the 
differing interests and values had on the decision-making processes. It was viewed as 
critical for the validity of this thesis to begin with an outline of the current debate on 
how the concepts of interests and values are applied to understand states‟ behaviour. It 
has been argued that it is difficult to define what motivates states to participate in 
peacekeeping operations, as the rationales consist of a complex set of outspoken and 
more „hidden‟ factors. Case studies based on interviews and document analyses are 
especially prone to the challenges of validity, because it essentially depends on the 
research design and the questions at hand. The explorative design of this thesis has 
allowed for flexibility in discovering explanatory variables for the MINURCAT 
contribution, but there is no guarantee for knowing whether an inclusion of other 
variables would have led to different results.  
The framework of interests and values was used as theoretical tools to assess how the 
concepts could shed light on the political considerations. The hypotheses presented 
were used as analytical tools to evaluate to what extent the differing factors influenced 
the considerations. When exploring the two concepts, new sub-variables emerged, thus 
broadening the understanding of the political processes. In the analysis it was argued 
that „ethics of responsibility‟ appeared to have been the initial motivation for engaging 
in Chad: through the MINURCAT contribution Norway wanted to inspire other 
Western states to commit to peacekeeping in Africa. By applying a high quality field 
hospital, EUFOR countries were confident of the security of their troops, and chose to 
re-hat to the MINURCAT mission. Consequently, one part of Norway‟s ambition was 
achieved. However, when applying ethics of responsibility, the actor must show a 
willingness to invest until the final results are achieved. By initially limiting the 
contribution to one year, the Norwegian government was thus restricting its overall 
commitment to the operation. This was not necessarily a problem, as it was planned 
for Russia to continue the running of the hospital when Norway departed. However, in 
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late 2009, it became clear that Russia was not able to act on its promise, and the UN 
was left without adequate medical support. This time, the need for Norway‟s 
continuation was more acute, and the premises for UN‟s request had thus changed. 
Even so, Norway chose to remain at its decision to depart Chad in May. Leaving a 
peacekeeping operation that so outspokenly needed Norway‟s assistance cannot be 
classified as „ethics of responsibility‟.  
Throughout this thesis it has been argued that limiting the contribution to one year 
signalled a lack of responsibility to the situation in Chad. It has been referred to USG 
Malcorra‟s argument that an enabling force necessitates a more long-term deployment 
of troops. This was not doable in the case of Chad, because the UN troops were 
evicted before such objectives could be achieved. But as known, Norway chose to 
discontinue its efforts before this decision was official. Knowing that the fundamental 
objectives of the MINURCAT contribution could only be achieved by a long-term 
deployment, Norway did nevertheless state that they could only manage a one-year 
contribution. As Senior Advisors argued, there was political will to continue the efforts 
beyond the one-year time frame, but this willingness was restrained by the NAF‟s 
capacities. As the implementation of the political aspirations had been challenged by 
the military constraints, Norway‟s motivation was thus reduced to an action guided by 
values more similar to „ethics of conviction‟: The Norwegian government was only 
willing to „do good‟ by contributing with a field hospital in Abéché, but was not able 
or willing to continue the efforts. The „lack of something extraordinary‟ proved that 
the commitment to the operation was limited by practical concerns and other priorities. 
As the analysis illustrated, the motivations for contributing to MINURCAT were 
indeed composed of several other variables than the „will to do good‟. The preference 
of deploying troops to MINURCAT instead of the UN operation in Haiti was 
explained as the government‟s ambition to support the UN in Africa. Re-affirming 
Norway‟s commitment to the UN has consistently been emphasised by interviewees as 
an important motivational factor. Multilateralism has been highly valued by 
Norwegian politicians, and it has been argued that cooperation with more powerful 
states as well as good relations with the international community has been important to 
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a small country like Norway. The overall ambition of re-affirming commitment to the 
UN through the deployment of troops can be understood as a rather interest-based 
motivational factor: Image and prestige is a way of enhancing Norway‟s „soft power‟ 
on the international scene. Deputy Military Advisor Holmen argued that this was 
accomplished by a one-year deployment, and in the long run the discontinuation of the 
hospital did hardly damage an already stated dedication.
277
 Contrary to Holmen‟s 
argument, Karlsrud claimed that the relatively short and rather expensive contribution 
did not produce the wanted political prestige within the UN.
278
 Norway was critiqued 
for spending an extensive amount of resources without a complementary political 
commitment and endurance.  
However, the decision of supporting the UN in Africa translates as a rather general 
goal and does not explain the specific contribution to Chad. One reason for this choice 
was arguably that the military expertise was transferable from the long-term 
commitment to neighbouring Sudan. Even though it became evident that the military 
engineers were not needed in Chad after all, Norway still stuck by its decision. This 
was explained by the commitment to Sudan, and the motivations for contributing to 
UNAMID were thus influencing the decision to engage in Chad. The involvement in 
Sudan was characterized by the „need‟-factor together with more interest-based factors 
such as political and economic interests and Chad was thus chosen as „next door‟ 
solution. But as the situation in Chad was less acute and had little political and 
economic importance to Norway, the element of transferability was perhaps too small 
to induce a sustainable commitment to MINURCAT. In other words: interest-based 
factors motivated the Norwegian government to contribute to Chad, but as those 
factors proved to be less relevant than first expected, the motivations for continuing 
the efforts in Chad diminished.  
A third explanation for why Norway preferred Chad to Haiti required a discussion of 
the general trends of international security concerns. As the attention of the NAF 
primarily had been directed towards Afghanistan, the military did arguably need to 
diversify its capabilities by participating in other types of conflicts. This is especially 
                                                                
277 Holmen, 10.06.2011. 
278 Karlsrud, interview 09.06.2011.  
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due to the predicted withdrawal of ISAF, which will lead to the deployment in other 
types of conflicts. Hence, one motivational factor for a short-term commitment in 
Chad was to prepare the NAF for future military operations in Africa. If a substantial 
part of the motivation for deploying troops in Chad can be explained by a desire to re-
introduce the military to the UN and Africa, a short-term and rather „easy‟ contribution 
is reasonable. However, basing a commitment on military needs necessitates 
considerable interest-based explanations, and reduces the validity of altruism and 
solidarity as motivational factors.  
This thesis has detected evidence that supports the assumption that value-based 
motives initiated the Norwegian efforts in Chad. Furthermore, Norway was prepared 
to contribute to a greater extent than what the UN expected. However, this was only 
related to the costs and not the duration of the contribution. Norway had initially 
limited the efforts to one year, and stuck by its decision even though they were 
requested to stay. This thesis has deducted two explanations for this choice of action: 
The one-year contribution did apparently allow for the fulfilment of the political 
objectives set by the government: Norway‟s self-image as a nation of peace was once 
again asserted, and the UN also noted its „hands-on‟ commitment: Norway‟s „soft 
power‟ had been strengthened. In addition, the NAF was introduced to peacekeeping 
in Africa and returned with new experiences and arguably a more positive view on UN 
operations: thus Norway‟s military power had been strengthened as well.  Linking the 
findings to the hypotheses, it suggests that even though values were explanatory for 
Norway‟s initial commitment to peacekeeping, it is gathered that national interests – or 
rather lack of interests in Chad, was explanatory for the decision to limit the 
contribution to one year. 
In sum, it is argued that the MINURCAT contribution did not fully re-affirm Norway‟s 
objective to „reintroduce a commitment to the UN and restore the balance between the 
contributions to the UN compared to NATO operations,‟279 but instead symbolized a 
stepping-stone in the predicted transition from Afghanistan to Africa.  
                                                                
279 Eide, interview 16.05.2011.  
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Appendix 
 
Interview guide 
 
1. What was your role in considerations concerning Norway's contribution to 
MINURCAT? 
2. If we assume that Norwegian foreign policy is characterized by a dualism, in 
which both values and interests characterize the decision-making processes: 
Would you say that one of the lines was more important than the other in the 
decision to contribute to MINURCAT? 
3. How important was the desire to help in Sudan?  
4. What was the reaction within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when they 
received the request(s) from the UN? 
5. How was the relationship between the MFA, MOD and the NAF in the 
decision-making processes? 
6. How and why was it decided that the enabling force would last one year? 
7. After several negotiations, the final result was that Norway refused to continue 
the contribution. How do you explain this behavior? 
8. Are there challenges related to this decision? Are you familiar with any 
negative reactions from the United Nations? 
9. Does this experience tell us something about the trends of Norwegian foreign 
policy of today? 
10. Can the considerations tell us something about a general lack of political will to 
commit for a longer period in operations in Africa? 
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Interviews 
 
 Eide, Barth, Espen. State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
former State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence. Interview 16.05.2011.  
 Ekhaugen, Lene. Research Fellow, Department of Civil-Military Relations, 
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Interview 01.02.2011. 
 Falkman, Helle. Senior advisor at the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 
Department of UN and Security Policy in Africa. Interview 25.02.2011, e-mail 
correspondence 13.04.2011.  
 
 Frøholm, Anne-Kjersti. Senior peace operations advisor at the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Security policy and North America. 
Interview 24.02.2011. 
 
 Hansen, Fred, Ketil. Professor at Oslo University Collage, Development 
Studies. Interview 4.11.2010. 
 
 Holmen, Bengt. Counsellor/Deputy Military Adviser,  Peace Operations, 
Political Affairs, The Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations. 
Interview per telephone 10.06.2011 
 
 Karlsrud, John. Research Fellow at NUPI and former Special Assistant to the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General to MINURCAT. Interview 
31.01.2011 and 09.06.2011.  
 
